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For more than half a century, Russia and Japan have not been able to sign a final 
peace treaty ending World War II and fully normalize the relations between the two 
states. The reason for this abnormal state of relations is a dispute over four materially and 
strategically insignificant islands that were seized by Soviet forces in the last days of 
World War II. These four islands are Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai 
Islets, a group of tiny islands commonly referred to as Habomai or the Habomais. They 
are known collectively to the Japanese as the Northern Territories and to the Russians as 
the Southern Kurils. The islands extend outwards from the Cape Nosappu on the north 
east tip of Hokkaido; the closest of the Habomais is 3.7 km away and Etorofu is the 
farthest at 144.5 km. In the Soviet Japanese Declaration of 1956 that normalized 
relations, the Japanese were promised Shikotan and the Habomai Islets upon the 
conclusion of a peace treaty. Though relations between Japan and Russia have gone 
through good and bad periods, there has been no substantial progress in real terms since 
the 1956 declaration. 
The reason for the dispute can be found in domestic factors in both Russia and 
Japan that have their roots in the earliest contacts between the two peoples. The Russo-
Japanese War was the first major defining moment, as the mutual images put forth 
through propaganda during that conflict can still be seen in current mutual perceptions 
between Japanese and Russians. The second defining moment in mutual relations was 
World War II, when the islands were seized by Soviet forces. The symbolic value of the 
islands was largely established at that point, as the Russians felt the humiliation of the 
Russo-Japanese War had been overcome, and the Japanese felt aggrieved that “inherent 
territory” of Japan was taken from them. The symbolism continues today, and is 
exploited by nationalists in both countries as an easy, emotional issue. Public opinion on 
the issue in both countries has remained firm, and gives negotiators little leeway with 
which to work towards resolution of the territorial dispute.  
Relations have progressed between the two countries since the last days of the 
Soviet Union, and regional economic integration has slowly begun, as Russian fishermen 
 xvi
now sell most of their catch to the Japanese. However, poaching, mutually depressed 
economies, environmental problems and fisheries depletion have become significant 
problems in the Russian Far East and Hokkaido. Japanese investment in the Russian Far 
East remains low, partially because of the Northern Territories issue and partially because 
of the better investment climate in China, Korea and South East Asia. Russian and 
Japanese priorities in the region remain different as each is more focused on bilateral 
relations with China and stability on the Korean Peninsula than on their relations with 
each other.  
For Russia and Japan to resolve their dispute, there will likely need to be a strong 
external stimulus that changes the entire paradigm of their relations and forces them into 
a closer relationship. Three scenarios are offered as possibilities: first, a hostile, unstable, 
but more powerful China; second, a significant curtailment of Persian Gulf oil through 
war; and third, full Russian membership in NATO. Although these are examples of 
events that may change Russo-Japanese relations, the overall prognosis remains bleak. A 
far more likely outcome is indefinite stalemate or increased Japanese apathy. However, 
any resolution that does not either fully or substantially meet Japanese demands may 
result in continued irredentism, Japanese refusal to invest in the Russian Far East, and no 
possibility for a regional cooperative security regime or organization such as the OSCE in 
Europe. Stability and security in the region could be affected in the long term if relations 




A. A TANTALIZING QUESTION  
Officially, the Second World War is not over between Japan and Russia. 
Although the guns have long been silent, 57 years after the Japanese surrendered 
unconditionally to the Allies, there is still no peace treaty between Russia and Japan. This 
abnormal state of relations has been perpetuated by a conflict over four small islands – 
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai – seized by Soviet forces after Japan’s official 
surrender onboard the battleship USS Missouri. Origins of this dispute predate the 1867 
Meiji Restoration. The factors that contribute most to the ongoing dispute are conflicting 
interpretations of history, opposing cultural views of territory, the Cold War which 
undermined attempts to resolve the dispute, economic differences and domestic politics 
in Russia and Japan. 
The definition of the “Kuril Islands” has been one of the most contentious issues 
between the Japanese and Russians. This is because the Japanese officially renounced 
sovereignty over the “Kuril Islands” in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. What is 
generally known as the Kuril Island chain corresponds roughly to the “Chīshima Rettō” 
or “Thousand Islands” for the Japanese. The Japanese now explicitly define the “Kuril 
Islands” as beginning north of Etorofu and extending to Cape Lopatka on the Kamchatka 
Peninsula. For the Russians, “Kuril Islands” designates the string of islands running from 
Cape Lopatka to the tip of Kunashiri, just off the coast of Shibetsu, Hokkaido. The 
Habomai Islets, a group of six tiny islands, and Shikotan Island are collectively known as 
the “Lesser Kurils.” The Japanese consider those islands to be an extension of Cape 
Nosappu on Hokkaido.  
B. WHAT ARE THE “NORTHERN TERRITORIES?” 
The “Northern Territories,” or “Hoppo Ryōdo” in Japanese, refer to the four 
“islands” closest to Japan. These are Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai 
Islets.1 Of the islands, Etorofu is the largest with an area of 3,184 km2 and also has the 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, the Japanese names of the islands will be used throughout as these are the more 
commonly accepted names used by scholars and cartographers. The Habomais, although consisting of six 
tiny islands, will be referred to as one island, as this is the collective name for all six islands, none of which 
2 
largest population at approximately 8,190. Kunashiri is next in size with an area of 1,499 
km2 and a population of approximately 5,500. Shikotan is the smallest of the settled 
islands with an area of 253 km2 and a population of approximately 2,450. The Habomais 
contain a total area of 100 
km2 and are uninhabited 
except for a small garrison 
of border guards. 
Altogether, the population 
of all the islands as of 
2001 was approximately 
16,140 ethnic Russians. In 
1994 the region was 
rocked by a series of major 
earthquakes that destroyed 
most of the canneries on 
the islands, which led to a 
large-scale exodus of 
people from the islands. 
Before the earthquake and accompanying tsunami, the population was approximately 
25,400 Russians.2 To put the islands in perspective, Etorofu by itself is much larger than 
Okinawa.3 While the islands amount to an insignificant percentage of the Russian 
Federation, taken together they would be larger than 19 of Japan’s 47 prefectures.  
C. RELEVANCE, PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the circumstances surrounding the final 
unresolved conflict between Japan and Russia dating from World War II. Russia and 
Japan are now the only two major powers with global influence in the world that do not 
                                                 
have the name “Habomai,” and this corresponds to common usage.  
2 “Do you know about Japan’s Northern Territories?  The Northern Territories Issue.” Pamphlet 
published by the Hokkaido Government Northern Territories Countermeasures Headquarters, Sapporo, 
Japan.; Hiroshi Kimura. “Islands Apart.” Look Japan, February 2001 [cited April 22, 2002], available at 
www.lookjapan.com/Lbcoverstory/01FebCS.htm; INTERNET. 
3 “Our half century long appeal for Justice,” pamphlet published in Japanese, Russian and English. 
Figure 1: The “Northern Territories” (From:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA),
“Japan’s Northern Territories.”) 
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have normalized relations. Among Russian scholars, the Kuril issue is often relegated to a 
single paragraph or even a footnote in historical reports.4 Most scholarship on the Kuril 
dispute is limited to a select group of Japan-Russia specialists. Outside that group, little is 
known or understood about the origins of the dispute or the impact this issue has on 
Russo-Japanese relations.  
Japan’s importance to the world has steadily increased while that of Russia has 
been in precipitous decline. Formally eschewing military power, Japan has enacted a very 
successful form of “dollar diplomacy” through foreign aid. Despite a ten year long 
economic recession, Japan still has the world’s second largest economy and has quietly 
rebuilt its military power.5 The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are the third strongest 
military in Asia after the United States and China, and second only to the United States in 
terms of modernity. Although limited in missions to national self-defense, there has been 
some call for revision of the constitution that forbids Japan from operating its forces 
outside of the region surrounding the main islands. 
The relations between Japan and Russia are of concern not just to the nations 
along the Pacific Rim, but the world as well. How relations develop (or fail to develop) 
between Russia and Japan may have profound implications for East Asian security. Japan 
is the strongest U.S. ally in the region, playing host to the Forward Deployed Naval 
Forces, which include the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), as well as numerous 
Army posts, Air Force bases and a large contingent of Marines stationed on Okinawa. 
Russia, though in decline, is strategically important to U.S. interests based on its wide 
ranging and conflict-ridden borders, its arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, 
and its capability to be a great force for either stability or instability in the future. It is in 
                                                 
(City of Nemuro, Hokkaido, Japan: n.d.). 
4 For example. Adam Ulam mentions the Kurils only 3 times in his seminal Cold War text, Expansion 
and Coexistence. Hedrick Smith, Thomas Remington and Martin Malia do not mention them at all in books 
written generally about Russia or the Soviet Union. Robert Wesson, Alvin Rubenstein and R. Craig Nation, 
authors of works on Soviet and Russian foreign policy, mention the islands only in passing. 
5 Officially the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) are not a “military” as defined by the West, because 
the possession of a regular army, navy or air force is expressly forbidden by Article 9 of Japan’s 1946 
Constitution. The term “military” is used here for the benefit of American and Western readers for 
simplicity. The author recognizes that most Japanese do not consider the JSDF as a military in the 
conventional sense, but those forces that are required as a bare minimum for the defense of the Japanese 
home islands. 
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the interests of the United States to see this conflict resolved peacefully to ensure 
continued stability in the East Asian region. 
The intended audience for this thesis is primarily U.S. policy makers and officials 
that may serve in either Russia or the East Asian region. In the process, the goal of this 
work is to add new knowledge and a new perspective to the general scholarship 
concerning the dispute. The purpose of the thesis is to determine the effect of the 
territorial dispute on Russo-Japanese relations and to assess the prospects of resolution. 
The following secondary questions are also addressed: What is the origin of the territorial 
dispute; what role do domestic factors play within the dispute; and what are the security 
implications for Russia and East Asia. The hypothesis of this thesis is that, whatever the 
rhetoric, the actual resolution of the dispute is not a high priority among the policy 
makers in either Russia or Japan despite the fact that the ongoing dispute over the Kurils 
limits the amount of cooperation possible and precludes the signing of a final peace 
treaty. 
Chapter II offers a brief history of the territorial dispute to include the nature of 
the claims of each party to the islands. While it is not possible to do justice to the intricate 
nature of many of the arguments, this chapter endeavors to cover the major events 
leading to the dispute. Emphasis will be placed on showing the transition from early 
cordial relations between the two countries to the state of near-constant conflict that has 
characterized Russo-Japanese relations in the 20th century. The United States has also 
played a role in fostering and maintaining the conflict. Therefore the U.S. role will also 
be addressed. 
Chapter III discusses the material and political value of the islands to Japan and 
Russia. Strategic and economic considerations are occasionally given by commentators 
as being the real reasons for either retaining or claiming the islands. The chapter will seek 
to show that while these are valid concerns, current developments show clearly that the 
Kurils have only limited strategic and economic value. Politics, driven by domestic 
political considerations keeps the Kurils in the forefront of Russo-Japanese relations. 
Chapter IV focuses on the way the media, domestic politics, and public opinion 
affect the dispute and constrain diplomatic resolution. One argument of this thesis is that 
5 
the dispute has become mostly symbolic. Emotion must be taken out of the Kuril issue 
before the territorial dispute may be settled. The nature of those emotional issues will be 
considered, as well as the national myths deliberately created and nurtured among the two 
populations to keep the passion high. National myths play a pivotal role, as they blind 
populations to rational arguments and an objective assessment of national interests. 
Chapter V is an analysis of current relations between Japan and Russia. Although 
Russo-Japanese relations have come a long way since the end of the Cold War, they are 
far from normal. There is promise of increased cooperation, especially if the two-track 
process now in place continues, but there will always a limit to the amount of cooperation 
possible. Neither state sees relations with the other as a main priority, which reduces the 
need for final resolution of the territorial dispute. Cooperation on many issues has been 
possible, however, and the nature and amount of contact between the two is increasing, 
but they remain at loggerheads over the Kurils.  
The concluding chapter will look to the future of relations between the two 
countries and the prospects for settlement of the Kuril issue. It will examine what 
conditions might shift the priority ordering of Japanese and Russian policy makers that 
they might seek finally to resolve the territorial dispute? The conclusions will therefore 
look at what conditions must change in Russia, Japan or the world so that the leaders of 
both seek to fully or partially resolve the emotional issues that drive the dispute. Finally, 
the consequences of the dispute for the future of regional security will be examined. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Research for this thesis has been conducted using a variety of primary and 
secondary sources. It has been limited, however, by the requirement to use English 
language sources. These include press reports, official government sources, treaties, and 
official releases from the Japanese and Russian Ministries for Foreign Affairs, many of 
which are available on the World Wide Web. Personal interviews have been conducted 
with officials and scholars at the American Embassy, Tokyo, the National Institute for 
Defense Studies in Nagatcho, Tokyo and the Japan Institute of International Affairs in 
Ebisu, Tokyo. The National Institute for Defense studies is similar in nature to the United 
States National War College, and functions as Japan’s premier institute for the education 
6 
of senior officers in the Self-Defense Forces while filling a secondary role as a policy 
research institution. The Japan Institute of International Affairs is a policy think tank 
funded primarily through the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some information 
regarding Japanese and Russian public opinion is based on the author’s personal 
experience in both countries and on conversations with citizens of Russia and Japan. 
Although the experience of living in Russia and Japan neither constitutes nor takes the 
place of scientific research, it has been helpful to gain a general sense of the mood within 
those countries. An effort has been made to remain impartial throughout, though it must 
be acknowledged that much of the source material has come from Japanese authors. The 
author has made an effort to remain objective when reading these works in an attempt to 
try to recognize bias where it exists. Unfortunately, no large works by contemporary 
Russian authors that covers the subject of the territorial dispute exist in translation.  
E. A NOTE ON NAMES, SPELLINGS AND TERMS 
When writing Japanese names, I have chosen to use the format most familiar to 
Americans, with the given name first and surname last. The current Prime Minister of 
Japan is therefore Junichiro Koizumi rather than the traditional Japanese method which 
would be Koizumi Junichiro. Additionally, I have tried to be consistent in my use of the 
Wade-Giles Romanization system for Chinese, except where a different form is more 
widely recognized. The large port city north of Shanghai is therefore spelled Qingdao, as 
that is the form that will be found in most atlases, and not Ch’ing-tao as it would be 
according to Wade-Giles Romanization.  
Additionally, I have maintained transliterations of Russian place names rather 
than translating them. For example, I use “Primorskii Krai,” and not “Maritime 
Territory.” The Russian Federation is subdivided into several different types of 
administrative divisions that have varying degrees of autonomy from the Kremlin. These 
are in roughly descending order, “respublika,” “krai,” “oblast,” and “okrug.” Translated, 
these are “republic,” “land” or “territory,” “area,” and “district.” A respublika and krai 
are generally the most autonomous, and usually form the largest territorial divisions, 
though there are several large okrugs. I have tried to be consistent with spellings, 
however, any errors remain my own. Additionally, I have decided to use “Kuril” rather 
7 
than “Kurile” when referring to the Kuril Islands, because that appears to currently be the 
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II. ORIGINS OF THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY 
Searching for the “truth” among competing claims to the “Northern Territories” 
between Japan and Russia is almost by definition a subjective exercise. This is because 
every event in the history of relations between the two countries over the Kuril issue can 
be interpreted in more than one way. To understand the basis for the present claims on 
both sides, one must examine the issue in the context of the past 364 years. 
1. The ‘Opening’ of Japan 
In 1638, Shogun Iemitsu Tokugawa6 issued a proclamation banning all foreigners from 
the shores of Japan, excepting only a small Dutch mission on an isolated man-made 
island in Nagasaki harbor. For the next 150 years, the only foreign contact the Japanese 
had was with Chinese merchants and a few Dutch traders who were kept as virtual 
prisoners in their compound in Nagasaki.7 While the “opening” of Japan is generally 
considered to have been accomplished by Commodore Matthew Perry in 1854, the 
Japanese had been in contact with Russian explorers and envoys for more than 100 years 
before Perry arrived in Edo Bay.8  
The first of these explorers was Martin Spanberg, a Dane in the employ of the 
Russians. Spanberg probed the shores of Honshu and Hokkaido in 1739 as part of the 
greater exploratory voyages of Captain Vitus Bering to the Aleutians and Alaska. Two 
more expeditions were sent to Japan in the 18th century, the second of which nearly 
“opened” Japan to Russian trade, in the sense that the Russians almost gained similar 
trading rights as the Dutch in Nagasaki. Adam Laxman, the son of a St. Petersburg 
academic, led a 1792-93 expedition and received a letter from Japanese officials on 
                                                 
6 The “shogun” was a military dictator who ruled Japan in the name of the Emperor, who held no real 
authority. While the official capital of Japan was in Kyoto, where the emperor resided, the real capital was 
in Edo (present-day Tokyo), where the Tokugawa-dynasty shoguns made their residence. The Tokugawa 
dynasty, alternately called the Edo period or the Tokugawa Era, lasted from 1603 until the “Meiji 
Restoration” in 1868. Tokugawa rule is associated with the “closing” of Japan, and collapsed when the 
shogun officials were forced to “open” the country to the Americans, British and Russians in 1854-1855.   
7 John Fairbank, Edwin Reischauer, and Albert Craig. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, rev. 
ed. (Princeton, NJ: Houghton Mifflin Co.,1989), 409. 
8 Now Tokyo Bay. Edo was renamed Tokyo after the “Meiji Restoration” in 1868.  
10 
Hokkaido that would permit him to return to Nagasaki to negotiate trade relations.9 These 
first official Russian envoys conducted themselves in an exemplary manner, gave a 
favorable impression to the Japanese and were in turn treated well by them.10  
The wars of the French Revolution consumed the attention of the Russian Court, 
however, and Laxman’s letter was not followed up with another expedition until 1804. 
That expedition, led by Nikolai Rezanov as director of the Russian-American Company, 
was rebuffed by the Japanese at Nagasaki. Rezanov arrived in Nagasaki in October 1804 
intending to commence trade relations with the Japanese. Nearly six months were spent 
in Nagasaki waiting for the Edo government to decide whether to open trade, during 
which time Rezanov was led to believe the Japanese were interested in opening trade. 
After an initially cordial reception, less and less contact was permitted between the 
Russians and Japanese, Rezanov was suddenly sent away and told never to return to 
Japan.11 Taking the rebuff as a personal insult, Rezanov dispatched two lieutenants on 
punitive raids to northern Japan.12  
By the middle of the 19th century, in addition to the Russians, the Americans and 
British had become actively interested in opening the Japanese to trade as they had the 
Chinese. Each year increasing numbers of both American and British ships began to 
appear regularly in Japanese waters. As the Japanese learned of British actions in the 
Opium War 1839-42 and the transformation of imperial China into a semi-colonial state 
at the hands of the Western powers, Shogun’s officials were divided over how to deal 
with the Russians, Americans and British who were intruding in Japanese waters in 
increasingly large numbers.13 The Japanese were determined that what happened to the 
Chinese should not happen to them as well.  
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1854-1855 was a pivotal time for the ruling Shogunate, divided almost evenly 
between those eager to exclude foreigners and others who argued that Japan had many 
useful lessons to learn from them, lessons that, properly applied, would preserve Japan’s 
independence. Eventually American Commodore Matthew C. Perry broke the deadlock 
by leaving a not so subtle threat in 1852 that when he returned, he would bring with him 
a large fleet. In fact, he returned in 1854 with one quarter of the U.S. Navy.14 The 
leadership understood it would take little effort for him to halt the seaborne rice trade 
upon which the population of Edo was dependent and so elected to negotiate. 
Unlike the Americans and British who were only trying to force Japan to end its 
exclusionary trade policies, the Russians sought to define their border and counter the 
growing influence of the British and Americans in North East Asia. Russian Admiral 
Evfimii Putiatin went to Japan in 1853 on the heels of the Perry expedition to attempt to 
open diplomatic and commercial relations and settle the boundary issue between Russia 
and Japan. Between Putiatin’s first expedition and his second in 1855, the international 
environment changed substantially for Russia. With the onset of the Crimean War, Russia 
desperately needed to settle the frontier issue on the Kurils and Sakhalin.15 When Putiatin 
returned to Japan, he did so in a single frigate that did not appear to pose much of a threat 
to Edo. Britain and Russia were at war, and St. Petersburg could spare no more than one 
ship. Consequently, the negotiations between Russia and Japan assumed more of a 
feeling of normal diplomatic relations between two basically equal entities, unlike the 
concurrent British and American negotiations with their implied threat of force.16  
Throughout the Russo-Japanese negotiations, territorial issues were the main 
points of contention, with both sides finally agreeing on the de facto boundary that had 
existed since the end of the 18th century between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu (Urup 
in Russian). No decision was taken on Sakhalin. This boundary definition was consistent 
with a unilateral decree issued by Alexander I in September 1821 that defined Russian 
territorial waters as north of the southernmost tip of Urup. Supplemental instructions 
further defining Russian boundaries were subsequently issued to Putiatin by Nicholas I. 
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These indicated that the southern Russian boundary should be Urup.17 The negotiations 
were long and difficult, with both Japan and Russia claiming the entire chain. In the end, 
however, a “compromise” was reached that recognized that, since the Japanese occupied 
Etorofu and the Russians occupied Uruppu, the official boundary should lie between 
those two islands. Sakhalin remained a point of contention, and it was decided to leave 
the island jointly settled with no clear line of demarcation between Japanese and Russian 
communities. This treaty was negotiated entirely during a time of peace between Russia 
and Japan. Therefore, it came to be regarded as the single territorial arrangement struck 
between equal powers without a threat of coercion by either side. Unfortunately, this 
atmosphere of cooperation between the two countries over the Northern Territories was 
not destined to endure. Incidentally, the border demarcation between Russia and Japan 
marked Japan’s formal acceptance of the Western system of nation-states with political 
boundaries. Being an island people, the Japanese hitherto had seen no need to define their 
borders until the Russians forced them to. 
2. Modernization and Equality 
After the “Meiji Restoration” of 1868, the most pressing problem faced by the 
new government in its relations with Russia was the lack of a defined border on Sakhalin, 
a legacy of the Shimoda Treaty. Both Russia and Japan tried for several years to establish 
greater claims to the island, leading to several conflicts and making the need for a 
settlement more pressing. International pressure and domestic unrest combined to push 
the Meiji leadership towards concessions on the Sakhalin question. On May 7, 1875, the 
two empires signed the “Treaty of St. Petersburg,” according to which Japan ceded to 
Russia all rights to Sakhalin. In return, the Tsar surrendered “the group of the islands 
called the Kurils, which he possesses, with all the sovereign rights belonging to this 
possession, so that henceforth the said islands of the Kurils shall belong to the Empire of 
Japan.”18 This statement is occasionally used by Japanese scholars seeking to support the 
Japanese claims as evidence that neither the Russians nor Japanese leaders at the time 
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considered the four islands that are now called the “Northern Territories” as being a part 
of the Kuril Islands. Rather, the Kuril Islands as defined by the 1875 treaty must begin 
north of Etorofu. The argument follows that since the Russians gave the “Kuril Islands” 
to Japan, and since they could not have given over something they did not own, the four 
disputed territories must not have been part of the “Kuril Islands.”19 At the time of the 
treaty, however, the four islands now disputed did not have a separate name of their own. 
All evidence points to the Japanese as being the side at a disadvantage during the 
1875 negotiations as Japan was still in the early stages of modernization. By the 1870’s, 
the sea otter and fur seal populations on the Kuril Islands had been decimated, so that the 
islands held relatively little commercial or economic value for the Russians, especially 
compared to the possibilities that existed on Sakhalin.20 Regardless, the negotiations were 
concluded peacefully, and with the border disputes with Russia apparently solved, the 
Japanese turned inward to focus on modernization. Unfortunately, the Treaty of St. 
Petersburg would be the last time the two states would settle territorial differences 
peacefully. 
As Japan modernized, the main priority of the Meiji government became equality 
with the West and revision of the “unequal treaties,” by which the Japanese meant all the 
original treaties signed with the various Western powers in the 1850’s at the end of the 
Tokugawa era (1603-1867). Equality required that Tokyo create powerful military forces, 
a strong economy and acquire colonies in Asia. Following in the footsteps of its Western 
mentors, the Japanese turned their attention to the Asian mainland, and their first efforts 
at expansion were directed toward Korea. Japanese aims in Korea brought them into 
increasing conflict with both China and Russia. Using Chinese intervention in Korea as a 
pretext, Japan went to war with the Ch’ing dynasty in 1894. By 1895, the Chinese were 
thoroughly defeated by Japan’s modernized forces, a Japanese victory that surprised 
many in the West.21 But it would be the clash of political and economic interests with 
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Russia, and not the war with China, that foreshadowed greater conflicts to come.22 The 
Japanese would not forgive the “triple intervention” of Russia, Germany and France that 
forced the Japanese to abandon the Liaodong Peninsula, which it had acquired from 
China in the Treaty of Shimoniseki. When Russia then “leased” the peninsula from China 
in 1897, gaining the ports of Lushun (Port Arthur) and Dalian that Japan had captured in 
the Sino-Japanese War and then been forced by the “triple intervention” to abandon, anti-
Russian sentiment “reached and unprecedented height in Japan. Russia had become an 
obvious enemy.”23 
The Sino-Japanese War came as something of a surprise to the Western powers, 
who expected the Chinese to win because of their sheer size.  While many in the West 
understood that the Japanese victory heralded the rise of a new power in Asia, they 
understood neither the intentions nor the capabilities of the Japanese. Between 1895 and 
1897, Japanese military expenditures rose exponentially from 20 million to 100 million 
yen as Japan rapidly increased its military might. At the same time, Japanese diplomats 
attempted to reach an agreement with Russia over spheres of influence and “exchange 
Korea for Manchuria.”24 Russian Minister of Finance Sergei Witte encouraged the 
construction of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in an attempt to stimulate development of 
the Russian Far East. Witte favored reaching accommodation with the Japanese regarding 
Korea and focus efforts in the areas of “trade and investment to project Russian 
influence” rather than military adventures to keep from provoking Chinese or Japanese 
resistance.25 However, rivals among the Tsar’s close advisors advocated “rapid and 
immediate expansion of Russian investment and control in both Manchuria and Korea, 
[because they] were confident of Russian victory in any consequent war.”26 A 
combination of the tsar’s personal weakness with opposing policies from the Ministries 
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of Finance, War and Foreign Affairs had resulted in significant over commitments, such 
that, “in 1904 Russia was ready for war neither in Asia nor in Europe.”27    
At the time, the dominant image of the Japanese in Russia was of a “country 
inhabited by polite, doll-like people” who were less than human and less than equal to the 
superior Russians.28 Although the Japanese had already defeated the Chinese, and had 
been steadily building up their military with the help of British and German advisors, the 
Japanese were not seen as a credible threat. The Chinese were not considered great 
adversaries, however, as various European powers had exacted concessions at gunpoint 
in the latter half of the 19th century, and the Russians had successfully forced the 
Japanese to give up some of their rights to China following the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese 
War. Little notice was given as well to the alliance signed between the English and 
Japanese in 1902. It was the “first military pact on equal terms between a Western and a 
non-Western nation” and was heavily promoted by officials in the Japanese government 
who were “convinced that war with Russia was inevitable.”29 Among Tsar Nicolas II’s 
advisors, Minister of Interior Affairs V. Plehve was of the opinion that, “to hold back 
revolution we need a little, victorious war.”30 In December 1903, after two years of 
inconclusive negotiations over respective interests in Manchuria and Korea, both Tsar 
Nicholas II and the Japanese Cabinet believed war was inevitable, if not necessary.31 
Nicolas himself was dismissive of the Japanese, whom he held in contempt and believed 
to be racially inferior, and did not listen to either his Minister of War Kuropatkin or 
Minister of Finance Witte, who was dismissed in August 1903. Both favored a 
conciliatory line towards Japan and reestablishment of friendly relations.32 The Tsar and 
his officials in St. Petersburg had drastically underestimated the strength of the Japanese, 
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however, and believed that if war occurred, the Russians would easily defeat Japanese 
forces.33 
The results of the war are well known and do not need repeating here. More 
important, however, the war impacted the perceptions that the Russian and Japanese 
people hold of each other, perceptions that have shaped and constrained subsequent 
diplomatic interaction. Until 1904 the average Japanese had no contact with Russia, and 
therefore probably had no opinion beyond simple curiosity regarding the Russians. 
However, after 1904-05, the dominant image of Russians and Japanese in each country 
was defined by the conflict and wartime propaganda. It should come as no surprise that 
the mutual perceptions developed during wartime were not flattering. Yet it would be 
those images set in the minds of ordinary Japanese and Russians that would continue to 
have a significant effect through the end of World War II, and arguably even today.34 The 
naval battle at the Straits of Tsushima and the “Treaty of Portsmouth” became enduring 
symbols of Russian national humiliation. Although the attack at Port Arthur was probably 
not the complete surprise it was made out to be, the war generated a strong desire for 
revenge among many Russians.35 For the Japanese, the war was immensely popular and 
established a symbol of national glory while simultaneously serving as a unifying factor 
linking the common citizen to the state.36 However, despite the popularity, the war would 
also prove immensely destructive to Japan. Not only had the Japanese strained their 
economy, but also they took away a mistaken belief that “‘spirit’ had been and always 
would be the key to success.” This belief would prove costly when the Imperial forces 
engaged in warfare with the United States in 1941 – a much more powerful enemy than 
the weakened Russian state of 1904.37 
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3. Hostile Friends and Fearsome Enemies  
Following the war, Japan and Russia entered into a rapprochement. In the Treaty 
of Portsmouth, Japan had secured its interests in Korea, which it annexed in 1910, and 
Japan and Russia gradually came to an agreement on the division of Manchuria between 
themselves.38 This brief period of cooperation ended with the rise of the Bolsheviks to 
power in the Russian Civil War. The Japanese invaded Siberia in 1918 along with the 
British, French, and Americans, to “protect Czech soldiers.” For Tokyo, however, 
intervention was a barely disguised attempt to broaden their sphere of influence in North 
East Asia.39 The Japanese eventually met fierce resistance from Soviet partisans as the 
“intervention” dragged on long after the other allies had all withdrawn their forces from 
Soviet territory and the “Reds” consolidated their hold on the country. The goal of 
Japanese policy during the intervention was to prevent any one White Russian leader 
from consolidating his hold in Siberia rather than to defeat the Bolshevik revolution. 
Therefore, they supported many “leaders” whose “opposition” to the Bolsheviks involved 
pillaging and murdering civilian populations.40 Diplomatically isolated in an action that 
also found no support at home, the Japanese finally pulled out their last troops in October 
1922.  
The Soviets never forgot Japan’s anti-Bolshevik actions in Siberia and Sakhalin 
not to mention the Russo-Japanese War. Several scholars have argued that memories of 
Japanese intervention were a driving factor in Soviet policy toward Japan as late as the 
post-World War II period.41 There was a good reason for mutual mistrust, however. 
Japanese behavior in the interwar period was marked by harassment of Soviet fishing and 
merchant vessels, violations of Soviet territorial sovereignty in the Kamchatka peninsula, 
and flagrant violation of Soviet territorial seas by Japanese fishing vessels with assistance 
from the Imperial Fleet.42 Additionally, the Japanese were active on or near the Soviet 
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border in China, Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. The Soviets reciprocated by directing 
revolutionary and subversive activities against the Japanese government through the 
activities of the Comintern and a spy ring run by the famously well-placed agent, Richard 
Sorge.43 
The simmering hostility between the two states could not long remain dormant. In 
1939, Japanese and Soviet forces engaged in full-scale warfare along the Manchurian 
border with the Soviet client-state of Mongolia. In heavy fighting that lasted most of the 
summer of 1939, the Soviets displayed a “military superiority heretofore unseen by the 
Japanese.”44 Unable to defeat the Soviets on land, the Japanese sought accommodation. 
Although Stalin initially demanded Sakhalin and all of the Kuril Islands, in April 1941 as 
the European situation worsened, the Soviet Dictator agreed to a Neutrality Pact with 
Japan without major concessions.45 The main article of the pact stipulated that if “either 
side was involved in war with another power, the other would observe neutrality 
‘throughout the duration of the conflict.’”46 The pact was meant to last for five years, 
until April 1946. 
The role of the Neutrality Pact and its abrogation by the Soviets in 1945 has 
played a major role in Japanese claims regarding the disputed islands.47 It is important to 
note, however, that by 1941 neither the Soviets nor the Japanese trusted one another, and 
either would have broken the pact at any time if it suited their purposes.48 The Yalta 
Conference was the defining moment for U.S. involvement in the dispute. Many of the 
agreements reached between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin concerning the post-war 
world were secret, unknown even to many planners in the United States government and 
military.49 Roosevelt believed the islands had been taken from Russia in the Russo-
Japanese War, an impression that Stalin was in no rush to correct, although it is doubtful 
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that even had Roosevelt known the truth he would have acted differently.50 In just 15 
minutes, FDR agreed to Stalin’s suggestion the Kuril Islands be “handed over” to the 
Soviet Union, the justification Stalin would use to seize the islands in the days following 
the Japanese surrender in 1945. In April 1945, before the fall of Germany, Molotov 
announced to Ambassador Satō that the Neutrality Pact would not be renewed and that as 
of August 9th, the Soviet Union would be at war with Japan.51 
The atomic bomb did not come as a surprise to Stalin, as he had been informed of 
its preparation by a spy within the Manhattan Project. However, he did not expect the 
bomb would be dropped so quickly. Although Soviet forces were not yet fully prepared, 
he ordered an assault on Manchuria to begin August 9th.52 Soviet forces began their 
attack approximately 30 minutes after the declaration of war had been read to 
Ambassador Satō. The following day, Soviet forces in northern Sakhalin attacked the 
Japanese forces in the southern part of the island. Fierce fighting continued until August 
19th when most Japanese forces finally surrendered, although sporadic resistance 
continued for a few more days among small pockets of Japanese soldiers.53  
On August 18th, the Soviets commenced their attack on the Kuril Islands – nine 
days after the Soviets declared war, eight days after the Japanese signaled acceptance of 
the terms of Potsdam, four days after the Allies responded, and three days after the 
Japanese Emperor announced to his subjects that the war was over. The operations 
concluded on September 5th, when the Soviets consolidated their hold on the Habomai 
islets. The same day, Stalin made a speech to the Soviet populace, declaring that, “for 
forty years, we the men of the older generation, have waited for this day. And now this 
day has come. From now on, Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands will serve as a 
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means of direct communications with the ocean and as a base for the defense of our 
country against Japanese aggression. We have won.”54 The Kuril Islands were annexed 
into the Soviet Union on September 20th. 
B. WHENCE THE “NORTHERN TERRITORIES?” 
Why do the Japanese only claim the four islands that are commonly known as the 
“Northern Territories,” or “Hoppo Ryōdo” in Japan? The answer lies in the period 
surrounding the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, from 1947 to 1951. In 1951, 
the Korean War was at its hottest period, China had been “lost” to “world Communism,” 
the Soviets demonstrated the Americans no longer had a nuclear monopoly, and the 1948 
Berlin crisis had occurred. Although the goal of occupying Japan had initially been to 
“demilitarize and democratize,”55 by 1951 the United States was looking for an Asian 
ally to replace China. Like Germany in Europe, Japan offered several advantages: an 
industrialized economy, a diligent workforce, and proximity to the Soviet Union. 
The role of the United States in the dispute begins with Roosevelt’s dismissal of 
the Kuril chain as former Russian territory that had been seized through Japanese 
“violence and greed.”56 John Foster Dulles, the special advisor to the State Department 
for the peace settlement with Japan, was primarily responsible for writing the draft that 
would eventually be accepted as the San Francisco Peace Treaty. A Republican, Dulles 
was appointed by Truman in 1950 to ensure bipartisan support for the treaty negotiations. 
In his role as chief negotiator for the United States, he had to also conduct negotiations 
with all the nations of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), which comprised 11 nations 
with which the Japanese had been at war, as well as seek the approval of the 40 or so 
other nations which had declared war on Japan to insure the final peace treaty would be 
acceptable to all parties.57 Treaty negotiations among all the countries of the FEC – 
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which included the Soviet Union – were difficult, especially concerning territorial issues. 
Dulles consistently maintained that the Potsdam Declaration was the primary legal 
document upon which the treaty should be based, and that all other agreements were 
subject to confirmation through treaty.58 His draft marked the first clear rejection of the 
Yalta accords with the Soviet Union, which had still been the guiding principle in post-
war settlements, as the treaty did not “hand over” the Kurils to the Soviets, as specified in 
the Yalta accord. Officially, the “United States adopted the position that title could be 
transferred only to those nations willing to be a party to the peace treaty,” otherwise, 
Japan would renounce claim to the various territories without naming a recipient.59 This 
position marked a break with the Yalta accords, because the Kuril Islands were not 
automatically “handed over” to the Soviets with full international recognition. To gain 
undisputed title to the territory seized at the end of the war, the Soviets had to participate 
in and sign the peace treaty at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. Dulles 
accurately predicted the Soviets would refuse to sign his treaty.60 A consequence of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty was that by refusing to sign, the Soviets drove a wedge 
between the Japanese and themselves. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s interpretation is that Dulles 
did this by design to encourage irredentism towards the Soviet Union and to divert 
animosity for their defeat in the war away from the United States.61 Whether that was or 
was not his implicit intention, the “Northern Territories” dispute was a direct result. 
1. Respective Claims 
Despite the role of the United States was in fomenting the territorial dispute, and 
despite the fact that the concept of the “Northern Territories” is a designation created in 
the 1950’s at the height of the Cold War, it is possible that the issue would have arisen 
regardless of U.S. action or possibly even with Soviet signature of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty. The primary Japanese claim to the “Northern Territories” is that they are 
the “inherent territory” of Japan. Hiroshi Kimura, formerly of the Slavic Research Center 
at Hokkaido University, defines the concept of “inherent territory” as territory “that is 
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regarded as historically and legally as part of [a] particular country alone, due to the fact 
that it has belonged to that nation from ancient times without becoming the possession of 
any other nation.”62 Although this concept will be dealt with in greater detail later in 
chapter IV, it is important to understand that the four islands Japan now claims were the 
only four that were never under prior Russian control until their seizure by the Soviet 
Union in 1945. The demand for four islands is only the stated policy of the Japanese 
government because it was adopted as a goal of the Liberal Democratic Party on its 
creation in 1956.63 All other major parties have consistently demanded the return of the 
entire Kuril chain. The Japanese Communist Party demands the entire island of Sakhalin 
as well – the most extensive territorial demand of any Japanese political party.64  
Although the Japanese use legal arguments and officially refer to the Soviet 
abrogation of the Neutrality Pact in 1945 (which they never intended to honor themselves 
longer than it suited their purposes), or the invalidity of the Yalta Agreement because it 
was a secret accord, the main argument remains that the Japanese do not consider what 
they now call the “Northern Territories” to have ever been anything but Japanese. The 
historical record does in fact bear this out, as all four islands had always administered as 
part of Hokkaido since their colonization in 1799, unlike Sakhalin or the Kuril Islands 
north of Etorofu.65 The legal problems with the Japanese argument arise with Article 2(c) 
of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, when the Japanese renounced “all right, title and 
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claim to the Kuril Islands.”66 In the Japanese text, the Kuril Islands are referred to as 
“Chīshima Rettō,” which regardless of who controlled what islands, always conceptually 
included Kunashiri and Etorofu. Therefore, it could be argued that if Japan unilaterally 
accepts the terms of the San Francisco treaty, it cannot maintain its claim to these islands, 
although this does not mean Russia has a valid claim to legally retain the islands.67 In 
response to this, however, there is the previously mentioned argument that holds that the 
four islands were not part of the larger Kuril Island chain because the “Kuril Islands” had 
been given to Japan by Russia in 1875, and Japan had already been in possession of the 
four currently disputed islands at that time.68 Obviously, say the Japanese, Russia could 
not give to Japan that which it did not own, therefore the “Northern Territories” are not 
part of the “Kuril Islands” according to the Treaty of St. Petersburg. 
The Russians also claim rights to the four disputed islands based upon legal and 
historical claims, although the basis of the Russian claims is, like the Japanese, more 
emotional than substantial. Russian scholars and nationalists have advanced several 
justifications for their claims: prior discovery and exploration; the 1904 attack on Port 
Arthur and the 1918-22 Japanese intervention were illegal acts that annulled all previous 
treaties between the two empires freeing the Soviets of any obligations. All these are 
questionable, especially the last claim, since neither war between states (Russo-Japanese 
War) nor state succession (the Soviet Union as successor state to Russia) automatically 
annuls all previous treaties as the Soviets and now Russians apparently claim.69 The 1855 
Shimoda Treaty and 1875 St. Petersburg treaties both were negotiated under peaceful 
conditions, during which Japan was arguably the weaker partner. 
The main Russian legal claims, then, come from World War II, in the form of the 
Yalta agreement and the Potsdam Declaration. At Yalta, Roosevelt granted Stalin the 
Kurils as part of the price for Soviet entry into the war against Japan. The Potsdam 
Declaration reinforced this claim by officially limiting Japanese sovereignty to the four 
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main islands and “such minor islands as [the Allies] determine.”70 However, while the 
Russians are quick to point to these documents as laying a sound legal basis for their 
claims, they are less apt to point out Stalin himself essentially abrogated both documents 
in his post-war policies, treating both as mere formalities more for the benefit of his 
Allies than as constraints on his actions. There are two problems with Yalta as a legal 
basis for a claim, in the view of one Japanese scholar. First, the relevant protocol was a 
secret accord, and as Hasegawa notes, “it is difficult to refute Japan’s argument that no 
state should be bound by a secret agreement whose existence was not known to it.”71 
Second, Stalin never kept his end of the agreement, especially with regard to post-war 
Poland and in general allowing free elections in Eastern Europe. Additionally, the 
Potsdam Declaration called for the immediate repatriation of POW’s. But Stalin 
abrogated this agreement through the seizure of Japanese 640,000 POW’s for use as slave 
labor in gulags throughout the Soviet Union, an issue that still arouses anger among many 
Japanese. Although the Japanese generally did the same in the territories they conquered, 
the Soviet actions have created a sense of victimization among the Japanese that has 
enabled many of them to avoid a close scrutiny of Kwangtung Army actions in China and 
Manchuria. Regardless, over 60,000 Japanese had died or simply disappeared by 1957 
when the last POW’s were returned.72 The question thus remains, to what extent may a 
state benefit from agreements by which it does not itself abide? 
Whatever the legal arguments, the real Russian claim to the islands is more 
concerned with the idea that Russia was the victor of World War II, and Japan the 
vanquished, a point made very clear by Khrushchev during the 1956 negotiations.73 To 
paraphrase a former Soviet (now Ukrainian) officer, great powers do not give up 
territory, especially to a country that power has defeated.74 Kimura notes that despite the 
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Cairo Declaration, the Soviet Union gained 670,000 sq. km as a result of World War II, 
“an amount equivalent to the combined land area of Great Britain, Italy and Greece,” of 
which the “Northern Territories” are a small part.75 Thus, Soviet actions in the Second 
World War continued the historical pattern of incorporation of territory gained through 
conquest into the concept of the Russian homeland. To the Russian people, the Kurils 
were a reward for their sacrifices during the war, as well as final revenge for the national 
humiliation from the Russo-Japanese War. The results of the war are considered 
inviolable, and though Soviet/Russian scholars cannot point to any one legal document 
that transferred the disputed territories from Japan to the Soviet Union/Russia, the 
argument made by former Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1969 and reiterated by 
former Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in 1977 is that “national boundaries as 
they stand should not be subjected to alterations,” and that “a series of international and 
bilateral agreements and treaties led to the present situation.”76 While the borders of 
Russia have changed drastically since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the mentality 
remains at least as far as the four disputed islands are concerned. The domestic factor 
behind this situation will be explored later in chapter IV. 
2. Abnormal Normalization 
The 1955-56 negotiations that reestablished relations between the Soviets and 
Japanese did see a brief period when it looked as though a peace treaty might be possible, 
a combination of factors prevented resolution of the territorial question at that time. At 
the final negotiations in London, Soviet representative Jakob Malik informally offered to 
surrender the two smaller islands of Shikotan and the Habomais in return for a treaty. It 
has been suggested that American intervention prevented Japanese acceptance of the two-
island solution, when John Foster Dulles threatened that if Japan gave up its claims to 
Kunashiri and Etorofu, the United States would consider annexing Okinawa.77 While 
Dulles’ intervention may have had some impact, it probably did not play the central role 
suggested by Japanese-American scholar Tsuyoshi Hasegawa as the reason the talks 
eventually failed to produce a treaty. The hardening of the Japanese position may have 
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been the outcome of a power struggle between Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Prime 
Minister Hatoyama whose Democratic Party was merging with the Liberal Party of long-
time former Prime Minister Yoshida to form the present Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP).78 The one certainty in the matter is that, for whatever reason, the Japanese 
government changed its 1951 position when the Japanese Cabinet issued instructions to 
the Japanese negotiators that only the return of four islands was acceptable. Although 
settlement would have put the Americans in an uncomfortable position vis-à-vis 
Okinawa, the Soviets felt they should dictate the terms and anything else would be 
tantamount to a loss of prestige.79 
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III. VALUE OF THE “NORTHERN TERRITORIES” 
A. REAL OR IMAGINED VALUE? 
The Kuril Islands, and the four Northern Territories in particular, have been more 
than a footnote in history, although they are rarely recognized for their role. It was the 
Russian encroachment from the north along the island chain that forced Japan to become 
the first Asian “modern” nation in the Western mold. When U.S. intelligence lost track of 
the Japanese fleet in November 1941, they were sitting in strict radio silence in 
Hitokappu Bay in Etorofu. By launching the attack from Etorofu, the Japanese fleet 
avoided the regular shipping channels and was able to approach Hawaii undetected. 
Finally, the Pacific War ended with the Soviet seizure of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan 
and the Habomai Islets in the last combat action of the war. 
These four islands have stood in the way of a peace treaty between Russia and 
Japan for over half a century. Emotions have been enflamed in both countries as the 
dispute has cost the Japanese international prestige and the Russians financial assistance 
and investment from Japan. Those issues will be explored in later chapters. Yet for what 
have these two countries sacrificed so much potential? This chapter will examine the 
strategic and economic value of the disputed islands, and show that the primary value of 
the islands for both Russia and Japan cannot be explained in material terms. 
B. STRATEGIC VALUE 
1. Japan and the Northern Frontier 
The Kuril Islands were the first place Russians and Japanese came into contact 
with each other in the 18th century as Russian traders and adventurers moved south along 
the chain seeking riches and trade. The Japanese always looked at the northern reaches of 
their territory as a large frontier, something akin to the American West in the late 1800’s 
and early 1900’s. Before the Russians, there were the Ainu, who originally inhabited all 
of Hokkaido and the northernmost parts of Honshu. It was not until the 11th century that 
the Japanese fully consolidated their hold on Honshu and began to settle the southern tip 
of Hokkaido. For nearly all of recorded Japanese history, therefore, there has been a 
concept of a “northern threat” and a northern frontier that has required defense as the 
28 
modern Japanese civilization pushed northward from Kyushu and southern Honshu.80 As 
the Ainu were increasingly subjugated and the island of Hokkaido settled with ethnic 
Japanese, the “northern threat” became the Russian traders. Kunashiri and Etorofu were 
only colonized in the late 18th century in response to Russian presence on the northern 
islands as the Japanese felt they had to define a border with Russia. Therefore, at the 
beginning of Russo-Japanese relations, the islands were strategically important to the 
Japanese as a buffer against the Russian empire to protect Hokkaido and, more 
importantly, Honshu.81 
After the Shimoda and St. Petersburg Treaties were signed in 1855 and 1875 
respectively, the Japanese had a defined border with the Russian empire, and the sense of 
a northern threat should have disappeared. The Kurils proved strategically significant 
again for the Japanese when, in 1941, the attack on Pearl Harbor was launched from 
Hitokappu Bay in Etorofu. After the Soviets seized the entire chain in 1945, the “northern 
threat” reappeared in the Japanese psychology. By taking control of Etorofu, Kunashiri, 
Shikotan and the Habomais, the Soviets placed themselves within sight of Japan’s 
northern coast. The strategic value of the islands then shifted from the offensive to the 
defensive for the Japanese. The islands remained important for Japanese Defense Agency 
planning, whose annual Yama-Sakura exercise scenario was of an invasion of Hokkaido 
by Soviet forces staged on the islands.82 How the Japanese would have utilized the 
islands for their own strategic interests is unclear, considering that Japanese demands for 
the Northern Territories had from the beginning included an implicit understanding that 
the islands would be demilitarized.83 Addressing the JDA’s valuation of the islands, 
collaborating Japanese and American scholars Masato Kimura and David Welch note in a 
1998 study that: “[Japanese] arguments have been entirely derivative of Soviet 
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arguments. Japanese officials regarded the islands as strategically significant only 
because the Soviets so regarded them.”84 
While Japanese control over a demilitarized Kunashiri and Etorofu may have 
allowed U.S. attack submarines easier entry into the Sea of Okhotsk, the real strategic 
difference would have been negligible, especially considering the straits around the 
Northern Territories are choked by ice floes from December until April.85 Only 
underwater nets, obstacles or mines could have been a serious challenge to a U.S. 
submarine seeking entry to the Sea of Okhotsk. Additionally, anything that keeps 
American attack submarines out of the Sea of Okhotsk will also keep out Russian 
strategic missile submarines. The two primary Russian Pacific Fleet bases are located 
outside of the Sea of Okhotsk: Vladivostok is on the Sea of Japan, and Petropavlovsk is 
located on the Pacific Ocean side of the Kamchatka Peninsula.86 Since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and the corresponding decline in the Russian military, the strategic 
value of the four islands has become negligible for the Japanese. The Japan Defense 
Agency no longer considers Russia a threat, and no longer conducts exercises directed 
against Russian forces.87 
2. Defense of ‘Lake Okhotsk’ 
For Russia, the islands were at first seen as “stepping stones” to Japan and a 
means for indirect trade with the Japanese through the indigenous Ainu.88 The 
fortifications built in the southern Kurils were intended to enforce the subjugation of the 
Ainu, and were not initially directed towards any threat, real or perceived, from the 
Japanese. The Ainu had resisted early Russian efforts on the Kurils, killing 21 of 39 
members of a hunting expedition in 1771 on Uruppu. When the Russians took warships 
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on further expeditions, it was for protection against the Ainu, and not the Japanese.89 Any 
possible strategic importance of the island chain was not recognized by Russia until the 
mid-19th century after the Crimean War with France and Britain, when the islands were 
recognized as potentially important for defending the Russian Far East, though Sakhalin 
was ultimately deemed more important.90  
The islands were at the “junction of American, Russian and Japanese territory,” 
and achieved a new significance for Russia as their value was belatedly realized.91 
Between 1875 and 1945, the entire Kuril chain was possessed by the Japanese. Following 
the annexation of Korea in 1910, the Japanese controlled all the approaches to the 
Russian/Soviet Far East, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. After the Russian 
revolution, the Japanese regularly harassed Soviet ships attempting to pass through the 
islands to Siberia and Japanese fishermen regularly violated Soviet territorial waters.92 
Belatedly, the Soviets learned what Russian Admiral Stepan Makarov had understood 
prior to his death in the battle for Port Arthur: the Kuril Island chain was strategically 
important for the defense of Siberia.93 
In 1945, before the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear 
bombers, long range nuclear powered strategic missile (SSBN) and attack (SSN) 
submarines and surface-to-air guided missiles, the islands held significant strategic value 
for the Soviets. As the post-war order began to emerge and the Soviets found themselves 
now in opposition to their former allies, all the islands, but especially the four closest to 
Japan, gained a new importance. Hiroshi Kimura quotes Nikita Khrushchev in a 1964 
conversation with a delegation of Japanese socialists: “It should be kept in mind that the 
islands are of small economic value but of great strategic and defensive importance. We 
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are concerned with our own security.”94 Kimura also mentions another 1964 episode 
where Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan told former Japanese Prime 
Minister Ikeda Hayato that the islands could not be returned because they were “a 
gateway to Kamchatka.”95 Khrushchev mentioned the Kurils and Northern Territories as 
he dictated his memoirs, though he seemed to have a change of heart regarding their 
strategic importance: “In these days of modern military technology, the islands really 
have very little value for defense.”96 Perhaps this was because he was talking in 
hindsight, or was simply mistaken regarding the circumstances surrounding the 1956 
normalization negotiations between the Japanese and Soviets. Regardless, dictating in 
1969 he showed his concern about the islands: “It would have been sheer folly to 
relinquish the islands to Japan when the country was essentially under American 
occupation. We figured the minute we gave Japan the two islands, the United States 
would turn them into military bases.”97  
In fact, the islands increased in strategic importance for the Soviets as the Cold 
War heated up in the late 1970’s and Delta II SSBN’s were deployed to the 
Petropavlovsk naval base on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Soviets adopted a “bastion” 
strategy, where the Sea of Okhotsk would be the primary operating area for SSBN’s and 
the Soviet Navy mission would be to defend the sea from intrusion by U.S. Navy 
forces.98 The Sea of Okhotsk was to be a Soviet lake, impenetrable to U.S. forces. 
Through the 1980’s Soviet military presence on the Northern Territories was increased 
substantially to eventually include a regiment of MIG-31 fighter aircraft, an armor 
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division on Etorofu and an infantry battalion on Kunashiri as well as early warning radars 
and an underwater acoustic monitoring station on Etorofu.99 Until 1991, the islands 
maintained their important role in the Soviet “bastion” of ‘Lake Okhotsk.’  
After 1991, the strategic value of the islands disappeared with the Soviet Union. 
Although Russian Ministry of Defense officials have continued to insist the islands are 
strategically important to Russia, lack of funding, poor morale and deteriorating assets 
are quickly making the strategic argument a moot point.100 If current trends continue, it 
will not be long before the Russian Pacific Fleet will not have any strategic assets left to 
protect. Because of poor maintenance and lack of funds for refueling, service lives for 
Russia’s SSBN’s have been cut from the designed 25-30 years to 10-15 years.101 In 1990, 
the Soviet Union had 24 operational SSBN’s in the Pacific Fleet, yet 10 years later that 
number has been reduced to 11, not all of which are operational.102 The bastion strategy 
of the Russian Navy is a relic of the Cold War that is no longer valid in the current 
international situation of cooperation between Russia and the United States. Russia is not 
considered a serious threat by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Pacific Fleet exercises are no 
longer based around countering the Soviet or Russian Fleet. While the islands would have 
been strategically useful to the United States at the height of the Cold War, this is no 
longer the case. Any Russian argument that the islands are still strategically valuable is 
hollow, and perhaps indicative of wishful thinking that the United States or Japan still 
considers the Russian Navy a strategic threat within its own right. 
C. ECONOMIC VALUE 
Neither Russia nor Japan has seriously made the argument that economic value is at the 
heart of the territorial dispute but the economic value of the islands cannot be ignored. 
The water around the islands is central to the economies of Northern Hokkaido and the 
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Russian Far East, and while not central to the dispute itself, it is economic issues that 
most frequently arise in the region.   
1. Fisheries 
The primary industry on and surrounding the disputed islands is fishing and the 
harvesting of other marine life, such as crab. Fisheries negotiations were among the first 
relations between the Soviet Union and Japan following the Second World War, and have 
generally served as an open line of communication between the two governments. 
Presently, both Japanese and Russians fish the waters surrounding the “Northern 
Territories,” legally and illegally. The waters surrounding the islands are a mixing area 
for warm currents coming from the Sea of Japan with colder currents coming from the 
Sea of Okhotsk. Consequently, as a Japanese pamphlet from Hokkaido notes, “it is a 
treasure trove of marine life, including salmon, cod, herring, king crab, and scallops.”103 
The region is also known for a special type of seaweed (Chīshima nori) that was 
considered a delicacy, and until 1945, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomais provided 80 
percent of the kelp used in Japanese cooking.104 Prior to World War II, the region 
provided roughly ten percent of the Japanese catch, and at the end of the Soviet period, 
the region amounted to approximately eight percent of the considerable Soviet world-
wide catch as well.105  
In the mid-1970’s a new issue arose concerning fisheries that followed world-
wide negotiations over undersea mineral resources. A 200 nautical mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) was unilaterally established by several states (including the 
United States in 1976) and was eventually enshrined within Articles 55 through 58 of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).106 This has had the 
effect of making the islands individually more valuable. This is especially true for 
Shikotan and the Habomais whose return would have the greatest effect on the Japanese 
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EEZ because of their location east of both Hokkaido and Kunashiri. Since 1985, 
however,  Japan and the Soviet Union/Russia have agreed on the same quotas in fishing 
negotiations, with Japan paying a premium price for fish in excess of the quota.107  
2. Economic Threat 
The greatest problem now facing both Japan and Russia with respect to fisheries 
is the effect of poachers. Russian sources estimate as of 2001, Russian-owned vessels 
were responsible for the smuggling into Japan of anywhere from $1 to $3 billion worth of 
fish and other marine resources, according to various Russian sources.108 Japanese 
poachers have also been active in Russian-claimed territorial water. The Russian Federal 
Border Service (FPS) alleged in 1993 that there were 1,912 instances of Japanese 
poachers violating Russian-claimed waters.109 Many of these poachers operated with 
impunity using fast, modern ships that the Russian FPS could not catch.110 Although the 
official numbers of violations have dropped (one article claims this is because the FPS 
began firing on suspected poachers), the reason may be less compliance by the Japanese 
than complicity of the FPS. In an article written for Izvestia with the assistance of 
Hokkaido Shimbun, Russian Duma member Boris Reznik details how the State 
Committee on the Fishing Industry, whose chairman is former-governor of Primorskii 
Krai Yevgeni Nazdratenko, and commanders of the FPS have been complicit in both 
Russian and Japanese poaching. Reznik writes that a “fishing Mafia” has developed 
where the border guards are used to put pressure on competitors, Russian monitors on 
Japanese ships are bribed to allow over-fishing, and in a specific example, 11 metric tons 
of “confiscated” crab (valued at $10-12 per kilogram) was turned over to a single military 
unit “to improve their collective rations” over the course of 2001.111 While there has been 
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improvement in communications between the Japanese Coast Guard and the Russian FPS 
since a 1998 agreement, the increased prosecutions of Russian and Japanese poachers 
may only reflect a selective elimination of competition on the Russian side, if Reznik’s 
information is accurate.112  The ultimate victim will be both Japanese and Russians, 
because if the current level of over harvesting is sustained then the marine resources of 
the entire Kuril chain will be depleted, with devastating effects upon the economies of 
coastal Hokkaido and the Russian Far East. 
3. Other Value 
As for the islands themselves, there is little of significant economic value. The 
islands do not contain any natural gas or oil deposits, and while there are some mineral 
deposits and timber resources on Kunashiri and Etorofu, the cost of extraction would 
likely exceed any possible profit that could be made. Taken as a whole, the resources 
“would only marginally supplement Hokkaido’s … resources.”113 The islands have very 
limited infrastructure, and there is almost no industry. The islanders all depend either 
directly or indirectly on the fishing industry, and the only operational industrial plant 
remaining is one seafood processing factory on Etorofu.114 Of the rest of the Soviet-built 
industrial facilities, they have either fallen into disrepair or were destroyed in a 1994 
earthquake that inflicted extensive damage on Kunashiri and Shikotan.115  
While the islands may not be economically valuable, there is a possibility for 
some economic development outside of the fishing industry if the territorial dispute is 
ever resolved. The Northern Territories are located “along one of the most volatile 
sections of the Pacific ‘rim of fire,’” and contain an unusually diverse array of vegetation, 
hot springs and natural attractions. During the Soviet era, Kunashiri and Etorofu were 
popular destinations for tourists from the Soviet Far East because of their extended 
summers and numerous hot springs.116 With the rise of eco-tourism throughout the 
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world, the islands could likely become economically self-sustaining on the basis of a 
revived tourism industry. The lack of infrastructure and economic development coupled 
with the relatively unspoiled natural state of much of the islands could prove attractive 
for tourists in search of exotic destinations. Additionally, the Japanese have a particular 
love for unique hot springs (onsen), and considering the number of remote inns and 
springs that survive throughout Japan, a revival of hot springs on the larger islands could 
bring Japanese tourists as well. But these prospects lie in the distant future, awaiting 
resolution of the territorial dispute and the free travel that only full normalization of 
relations between Russia and Japan can bring. 
D. VALUABLE, BUT… 
There is no disputing the islands have economic value. The territorial seas and the 
EEZ that accompany the islands total 196,000 km2, and contain some of the richest 
fishing grounds in the world.117 Both Russia and Japan rely extensively on the fishing 
industry, and fish is the primary staple for the Japanese. Therefore, possession of the 
islands would be important for either country. However, under current agreements both 
Japanese and Russian fishermen ply the extent of the Kuril chain, including the waters 
surrounding islands that are not disputed. There is no reason to believe this situation 
would change if either the Northern Territories were reverted to Japan or if the Japanese 
were to eventually give up their claim. The disputed islands themselves are of little 
economic value, and while they could be economically self sufficient (which they 
currently are not), they will never provide riches to either Japan or Russia. Since the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the islands have lost any strategic value they once had, and 
few Russians seriously believe either the United States or Japan would ever try to invade 
the Russian Far East in the future. Therefore, there must be some other explanation for 
why four small, sparsely inhabited islands provoke such an acrimonious debate and have 
prevented the final resolution of the Second World War. The next several chapters will 
show how it is intangible issues of pride and symbolism that prolong the dispute. 
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IV. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS IN RUSSIA AND JAPAN 
A. PUBLIC OPINION, MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS AND THE MEDIA 
Public opinion has been enlisted by both sides in the Kuril Islands dispute to 
support their positions. Positions are often staked out via the media, an entity that is 
simultaneously an influence on and a reflection of “public opinion.” In Russia, any hint 
of the possibility of returning the disputed islands to Japan is denounced in the press as 
something akin to treason.118 Although the Russian press is nominally free, stories are 
rarely written in an objective way. Direct criticism of the government is rare. In Japan, 
however, nearly every official or semi-official announcement is scrutinized by media 
sources as signs of progress towards a return of the islands. Although the mainstream 
Japanese press is usually more objective than the Russian, the Northern Territories 
dispute remains a sensitive national issue. The net effect has raised hopes among the 
Japanese public for restoration of the Northern Territories that cannot be realized in the 
near future.119  
Public opinion is a relatively new factor in Russian politics. Until 1988 “the 
Russian public knew virtually nothing of Japanese demands for the Northern 
Territories.”120 A perusal of recent stories indicates that little has been done within 
Russia to educate the population regarding the nature of the Japanese claims. Objective 
education is hampered by the fact that intense nationalism drives the coverage of the 
issue. The press of neither nation showcases its moderation when writing about the 
Kurils. Inflamed rhetoric is more usual than unbiased debate, which serves to limit the 
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maneuvering room of politicians attempting to negotiate. It also hampers objective 
research of the issue. As a result, information from either Russian or Japanese media 
sources is always of questionable objectivity.   
A gulf exists between individual and mass perceptions within Russia and Japan 
regarding each other. Although the two nations have shared a common official border 
since 1855, there has been relatively little contact between the two peoples on an 
individual level. One Japanese researcher has compared the situation to two neighbors 
who share a common backyard: they are neighbors, but they are more concerned with 
what happens on the street where their house faces. Consequently, they do not try hard to 
know the “backyard neighbor” because he is not important.121 The dominant perceptions 
of each country toward the other have been formed principally through a history of 
warfare and conflict that has dominated bilateral relations between Japan and Russia in 
the twentieth century: the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the Siberian Intervention 
from 1918-22, the “little wars” along the Manchurian/Mongolian borders in 1938-39, 
World War II from 1939-45, and the Cold War. Propagandistic denunciations have been 
common on both sides since the Russo-Japanese War, when the two populations came 
into mass contact for the first time. During that period, images of Russians as weak 
cowards and Japanese as monkeys or thieves that were somehow less than human were 
established in the respective national mindsets.122 These images were reinforced among 
the Soviets during the Second World War as Stalin prepared to go to war against Japan 
and felt the need to justify his violation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. The 
Soviet invasion of Manchuria and the seizure of the Kuril Islands served to reinforce the 
commonly held Japanese belief that Russians are not trustworthy, a belief reinforced by 
Soviet treatment of Japanese POW’s, and more recently by Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin’s cancellation of two scheduled trips to Japan in the early 1990’s.123 Japanese 
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public opinion regarding Russia plummeted immediately following those incidents as the 
percentage of people who feel hostile to or suspicious of Russia increased from 69.5 
percent to 79.6 percent in October 1992, and the percentage feeling favorable to Russia 
dropped from 25.4 percent to 15.2 percent.124 
The media are now the driving force in both Russian and Japanese mutual 
perceptions, as polls consistently show the majority of Japanese and Russians get their 
information regarding the other from the television, radio and print media.125 In Japan, 
this has had the effect of fueling distrust and negative perceptions, much as the extensive 
coverage given to crimes committed by members of the U.S. military in Okinawa impact 
U.S.-Japanese relations. Crimes allegedly committed by Russians, stories of the Russian 
mafia, or high-profile incidents in public locations have dominated the coverage of 
Russians in Japan.126 These stories from within Japan are reinforced by coverage of 
incidents from within Russia. When several Japanese tourists were harmed following the 
Japanese victory over Russia in the first round of the 2002 World Cup, the incident 
received repeated coverage on NHK (Japanese public television) nightly news throughout 
the remainder of the tournament, adding to the impression that Russia is an unruly and 
dangerous place.  
There should be little wonder that among the vast majority of Japanese who have 
little or no contact with real Russians, the dominant image of that country is negative. 
However, at least one survey suggests that the more day-to-day contact Japanese have on 
an individual level with Russian citizens, the more favorable their impressions 
become.127 While the authors of that survey admit their hypothesis, “needs to be tested 
                                                 
residents of Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and Japanese occupied territories in Korea and Manchuria who 
disappeared during the brief Soviet involvement in the Pacific War. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Between War and 
Peace, 1697-1985, vol. 1 of The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), 70-73. 
124 Hasegawa, Neither War nor Peace, 466. 
125 Joachim Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to 
the 1990s (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 286-287.; Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, 
“The Russian Presence in Hokkaido: A Research Note,” analysis of public opinion survey conducted in 
Hokkaido Prefecture, Japan, October 2001 (Monterey Institute of International Affairs, Monterey, CA, 
2002, photocopy), 9. 
126 Akaha and Vassilieva, “The Russian Presence in Hokkaido,” 9-10, 14. 
127 Akaha and Vassilieva, “The Russian Presence in Hokkaido,” 14. 
40 
on the basis of a larger, more representative sample,” the difference in opinions between 
those who have frequent contact and those who have no contact is significant. 
Nonetheless, the opinions of those respondents with no or infrequent contact generally 
correspond with official nation-wide public opinion surveys.128 Japanese who have had 
contact often use words such as “friendly,” “honest,” “kind,” or “cheerful” to describe 
Russians, as opposed to those who only know Russians from the media, who more often 
use negative descriptors such as “dirty,” “noisy,” and “authoritarian.”129 It will be 
interesting to see what effect – if any – increasing numbers of visits to Hokkaido by 
Russian commercial fishermen and merchants will have on the broader dynamic of 
Russo-Japanese relations. Unfortunately, as Hokkaido is relatively sparsely populated, it 
is likely that the only contact most Japanese might have with a Russian will be with one 
of the increasingly numerous Russian “hostesses” in night clubs and members’ clubs 
throughout Japan.130 According to official statistics, while only 123 Russians entered on 
student visas in 1999, 2,925 Russians entered on “entertainer” visas, a situation that does 
not bode well for the image of Russians among Japanese.131 
Increased contact with Russians is not the panacea for improved relations and a 
better image among the Japanese, however. There is increasingly a sense within Japan 
that Russia is not especially important to Japan economically, politically, or 
strategically.132 Put another way, Russia and Russians just don’t matter. When there was 
a threat from the Soviet Union, there was interest in Russia. But ten years after the 
demise of the Soviet Union, there is little public interest. There is a lack of hard 
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information or research covering this topic. However, anecdotal evidence lends strongly 
to such a hypothesis. One interviewee, a Russian expert and researcher at a MOFA-
supported think-tank lamented the decline in funding for Russia-related research. He 
remarked that he felt fortunate being where he was, as many colleagues that had been 
heads of Russian language departments in Japanese universities have lost their jobs and 
their departments have been closed because of declining student interest in Russian 
language or affairs. Where 20 years ago there was enough interest to sustain at least one 
full year group in most large universities each year, this is no longer the case. The 
number of Russian studies departments has decreased substantially as students have 
gravitated towards other Asian languages to complement the required English. Those 
departments that remain often survive by renaming their courses so that Russia appears 
nowhere in the title or course description, focusing instead on “Pacific security” or 
environmental issues.133 At the Japan Institute for International Affairs, the three research 
assistants for Russian Studies in 1997 had, by 2002, been reduced to only one. 
Considering the long period of poor relations throughout the 20th century, it is unlikely 
that interest or goodwill towards Russia will increase substantially in Japan within the 
near term.  
On the Russian side, there appears to be more goodwill towards the Japanese and 
Japan, irrespective of the territorial dispute. The reason why cannot be said for certain, 
however, it is likely the average Russian is more concerned with affairs in Europe and the 
West and simply does not think much about Japan. Interestingly, while Russians seem 
more willing to consider Russo-Japanese relations as friendly, over half of those surveyed 
in a nationwide survey were not aware that there was not a peace treaty between Japan 
and Russia.134 In the Far East, a good general opinion of Japan and a greater desire for 
better relations ironically coexist with an increased resistance to the return of the 
Northern Territories, the primary impediment to better relations. The answer to this 
apparent paradox is the Russian hope for Japanese economic aid.135 On the islands 
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themselves, the picture is even less certain. While visiting the islands in 1999 and 2000, 
Hiroshi Kimura got the impression that, while the majority of islanders on Etorofu were 
against a return of the island to Japan, the majority on Shikotan favored return, while the 
population of Kunashiri was evenly split.136  According to Kimura, the most distinct 
opinions expressed by inhabitants of all three islands were feelings that “they have been 
essentially abandoned by the Russian mainland and Sakhalin,” and that “if they are to 
survive, they feel they have no choice but to become integrated with the economic sphere 
of Nemuro and Hokkaido.”137 While the validity of the desires for reversion of the 
islands to Japan may be in question, the feeling of being forgotten by the Russian 
mainland mirrors that of inhabitants in the Russian Far East that they have been forgotten 
by Moscow.138 
The argument may be made (and is frequently made by Kimura) that the 
“Japanization” of the Kunashiri and Shikotan has already begun among those that have 
visited the islands. Residents already watch Japanese programs on their televisions, and 
get many of their supplies through trade with the Japanese in Hokkaido.139 A desire for 
greater economic integration is shared by the Japanese residing in the northern parts of 
Hokkaido. These people pressured the government to accept a new fisheries arrangement 
along the lines of a proposal made by South Kuril District mayor Nikolai Pogidin that 
would allow Japanese fisherman access to the fishing grounds surrounding the Northern 
Territories.140 Yet despite a shared desire for greater economic integration and resolution, 
the differences in opinion regarding how the dispute should be resolved are great. 
To what extent the Russians think seriously about relations with the Japanese 
outside of the Far Eastern Territories, or how much they know about Japan is an open 
question. Although Japanese restaurants are gaining popularity in Moscow, true 
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knowledge of the Japanese, Japanese culture, and the territorial issue itself remain 
relatively low, and little has been done to educate the Russian population according to 
some Japan-based Russia experts.141 Some Japanese groups have made efforts to 
“educate” the Russians on their own, including the MOFA, by publishing Northern 
Territories-related informational pamphlets in Russian and distributing them where 
possible. Many of these are decidedly biased, however, and the degree to which they may 
influence Russian readers is questionable.142 
B. NATIONAL MYTHS 
The Northern Territories dispute has become virtually intractable, in large part 
because of the national myths held by the Japanese and Russian peoples regarding 
themselves, their nations and the territories. Central to the Japanese view is the concept of 
“inherent territory,” in which “the Japanese have always considered the Northern 
Territories a part of the four major islands that constitute Japan proper.”143 “Inherent 
territories” are ones that have been “regarded historically and legally as part of that 
country alone, due to the fact that it has belonged to that country from ancient times 
without becoming the possession of any other nation.”144 The Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs makes a variation this argument in its web site devoted to the Northern 
Territories. It claims that “the ‘Kuril Islands’ that Japan renounced do not include 
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan or Habomai islands, which had always been Japanese 
territories.”145 There is historical support for this argument dating to the period 
immediately following occupation. At this time, local officials in Nemuro became 
concerned when they could not reach the inhabitants of the Northern Territories, which 
were under their local administration. No similar concern was shown by any Hokkaido 
authorities for residents on the other Kuril Islands or in Sakhalin because they fell under 
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the jurisdiction of the colonial administration rather than the home islands.146 The 
Japanese government has made a determined effort to convince the Japanese population 
that Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomais were not renounced in the 1951 
Treaty of San Francisco. For its part, the Ministry of Education has made the history of 
the Northern Territories dispute a required part of the middle and high school 
curricula.147 The return of the islands has therefore assumed a psychological dimension 
for the Japanese, because they have been linked to the concept of the Japanese national 
identity. This concept is also closely tied to the form of ancestor worship practiced by the 
Japanese, in which visiting and caring for the graves of one’s ancestors holds special 
importance, especially during the O-bōn festival (Festival of the Dead). The former 
residents of the Northern Territories and their descendants still have an important 
connection to the islands that will not decrease significantly until the passing of several 
generations.  
A second “national myth” propagated by Japan concerns the idea of the islands as 
the last symbol of defeat from the Second World War. Resumption of national 
sovereignty was the main priority in the years following surrender, especially after the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty restored Japanese self-rule in 1951. After the United States 
returned Okinawa to Japanese rule in 1972, the Northern Territories became the last 
Japanese irredenta not administered in the past by the colonial office – as Sakhalin and 
the Kurils north of Etorofu always had been – still under “foreign occupation.” Masato 
Kimura and David Welch note that, “Japan has paid an opportunity cost for its steadfast 
insistence upon the return of the disputed islands which is difficult to explain [rationally] 
… it is possible to explain the Japanese position only by noting the intrinsic value of the 
islands to Japan, which is best understood in terms of the importance of their recovery to 
the Japanese sense of identity.”148  
Supporting the WWII myth is the idea, also promoted by the MOFA’s Northern 
Territories website, that Japan was the victim of a perfidious attack and betrayal when the 
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Soviets abrogated the Neutrality Pact and took advantage of the impending Japanese 
defeat aggressively to claim spoils of war for itself.149 This claim is problematic, 
however, because it involves significant historical amnesia regarding Japan’s own actions 
during World War II. In 1940 the Japanese were willing to break the Neutrality Pact if 
the Soviets were sufficiently weak. In Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s opinion, the “surprise 
attack” claim “served as a psychological means by which the Japanese acquired a sense 
of victimization, which served as a major excuse to avoid atonement for the Pacific 
War.”150 The events of World War II and the actions of Soviet forces, beginning with the 
attack in Manchuria and ending with the seizure of the Kurils, Shikotan and the Habomai 
Islets, are often seen and referred to as two separate and distinct wars, in which the events 
of one had no connection to the other.151 Through this mechanism, the Japanese separate 
in their minds the behavior and actions of their forces from 1937 until August 15, 1945 
from those of the Russians during August and September, 1945. This allows Tokyo to 
maintain a sense of moral justification when arguing for reversion of the territories.  
World War II, or the Great Patriotic War as the Russians call it, has been 
incorporated into Russia’s own national myths. The Kuril Islands are seen as spoils of 
war and Russia’s justified reward for the tremendous sacrifice of its soldiers and peoples. 
Russians have traditionally seen themselves as “victims of foreign aggression, and 
Russia’s expansion is a consequence of victories over foreign invaders.”152 Russia has 
always been an expansionist, even colonial, power. However, rather than follow the 
Western European model of a sea born empire, the Russians established a continental 
imperium. Therefore, contrary to the Japanese perceptions of illegitimate Russian 
colonial gains, Moscow believes that, “Russia cannot sacrifice or sell what is perceived to 
be Russian territory.”153 To do so would lead to a further erosion of the integrity of the 
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Russian Motherland. This feeling has been accentuated with the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and the independence of many of its republics. This same concept is being invoked 
to justify the war in Chechnya: a “Domino Theory” encompassing the outlying regions of 
the Russian Federation that fears if one territory is allowed to secede, many others will 
follow. Additionally, if one part is let go, and is no longer “Russian,” the very nature of 
the Russian state could be called into question. Ivan Kovalenko captured this sentiment in 
1988 when, as a member of the Communist Party Central Committee, he stated: “If the 
results of World War II are reviewed, a chain reaction will occur, and as a result, the 
‘house’ called peace after the War will lean.”154 It is in this vein that Russian journalists 
assert that “the islands will not become Japanese territory.”155 
A specific justification used by Stalin for retention of the islands was revenge for 
defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. On September 5th, 1945, Stalin made his 
aforementioned famous speech declaring the end of the Great Patriotic War, in which he 
invoked the seizure of Japanese territory as being final revenge for the humiliation 
suffered in 1905 and the Treaty of Portsmouth.156 It is doubtful that these old wounds 
still fester except perhaps among extreme nationalists who call for the return of Alaska to 
Russia. But memories of past Russian defeat at Japanese hands played a large part in the 
propaganda used to justify incorporation of the islands into the Soviet Union. The value 
of the territories as spoils of war and now “inherent territory” of the Russian Federation 
still resonates strongly, and may explain why the Russians are able to turn over disputed 
land to China, but refuse to consider the same with Japan.157 The true value of the islands 
to Russia, as for the Japanese, is symbolic. For this reason, the majority of both 
populations fall back on their national myths to legitimize their respective position on the 
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Kurils.158 With arguments on both sides couched in largely moral terms, politicians are 
left little room for maneuver or compromise. 
C. POLITICIANS AND POLITICS 
The interplay of domestic politics and foreign policy have had a profound effect 
on Russian and Japanese actions, and has prevented both from acting in what would 
otherwise be considered the interests of the state. Since the end of the Cold War, neither 
Russia nor Japan has had a head of state that was domestically secure. In Russia, 
Gorbachev was the first to lose his power base to a public opinion made unpredictable by 
the turmoil of democratization. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, neither Boris 
Yeltsin nor Vladimir Putin has been able to attract a firm base of independent domestic 
support. Both have had to resort to courting nationalist allies to maintain their respective 
holds on power. Putin has managed so far to maintain high approval ratings during his 
time in office. But considering his rapid rise to power from relative obscurity, he may not 
yet have the standing to force a potentially unpopular decision through the Duma. For its 
part, Japan has had nine different Prime Ministers during the financially and politically 
turbulent 1990’s. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi saw his stratospheric approval 
ratings get cut in half overnight from around 80 percent to just above 40 percent when he 
fired the domestically popular foreign minister, Makiko Tanaka. Despite Tanaka’s own 
fall from power and resignation from Parliament amid allegations of corruption, 
Koizumi’s popularity ratings remain low as of August 2002, so it appears Koizumi’s 
initially high popularity may have been an aberration. Additionally, the LDP does not 
seem able to produce a strong, dynamic leader through its internal processes because of 
the compromises necessary to gain a leadership position within the party, which is 
necessary to become Prime Minister. Without firm support, neither leader can negotiate 
or compromise substantially on the Northern Territories, despite the benefits that could 
be brought to both through resolution of the issue and settlement of a final peace treaty. 
To answer the question of why these two states cannot come to an agreement on common 
interests, it is necessary to look at factors below the state level. 
Nationalism has been on the rise in both Russia and Japan, finding new power in 
times of political and economic stress in both countries. Within Russia, the Northern 
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Territories provide an easy emotional issue for rallying support. In the words of one 
Ukrainian military officer on his former countrymen, “Russians think of themselves as a 
great power, and great powers don’t give up territories.”159 A good example is an episode 
that occurred in February 2002, when the Duma mustered a majority to summon Russian 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to “answer one question: Is it true that the Russian 
leadership is planning to hand the Southern Kurils to Japan?”160 The summons was 
prompted by a statement from then newly-appointed Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko 
Kawaguchi. The Japanese press twisted her statement that she and Ivanov had agreed on 
preliminary negotiations over the disputed islands to imply that the Russian foreign 
minister had agreed to return the islands to Japan.161 The resolution found the 
Communist deputy who initiated the motion receiving support from the infamous right-
wing nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The announcement also provoked a spate of 
demonstrations in Sakhalin and a petition against returning the islands, though the 
islanders reactions are not mentioned.162 Ivanov quickly dispelled Japanese hopes and 
Russian fears, firmly stating that no progress had been made and there was no change in 
the stalemate.163 Regardless, if a peace treaty were signed that returned the islands to 
Japan, it would need to be ratified by two-thirds of the 178-member Federation Council. 
The Council is composed not only of regional executives, who are mostly aligned with 
Putin, but also of the more conservative and more nationalistic heads of regional 
parliaments. The likelihood of such a group ratifying a treaty returning all the islands is 
almost non-existent.164  
Putin is not the only one who must deal with ardent nationalists. Japanese 
nationalists constitute one of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s strongest 
support groups. This support has become more critical to Koizumi following his 
aforementioned dismissal of Foreign Minister Tanaka. Perhaps the most visible 
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expression of Koizumi’s leanings have been his two visits to Yasukuni Shrine, where the 
remains of war criminals executed in the late 1940’s – including General Hideki Togo – 
were enshrined in 1978. The Economist noted shortly after his latest visit on April 21st: 
“Mr. Koizumi … is hardly the innocent victim of devious nationalists. Far from being 
forced to choose, he used the Yasukuni controversy to his advantage during his internal 
party campaign [in 2001]. By saying he would go there on the August 15th anniversary, 
he was able to appeal to nationalist supporters, helping him win the party presidency.”165 
What is often overlooked in the controversy is that, for many years, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) was the only party whose territorial demands were confined to 
the Northern Territories. While most other parties demanded the return of all the Kuril 
Islands, some called for the return of Southern Sakhalin as well. Japan, like Russia, has 
been mired in economic recession since 1989, which has added to the political instability 
at the top of Japanese politics. Economic troubles often cause politicians to seek 
distractions to maintain support. During his internal campaign within the LDP to gain the 
post of prime minister, Koizumi co-opted a large portion of the “independents” that were 
leaning towards other candidates.166 Many of his rivals were more nationalistic in 
outlook, such as Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, author of the “anti-American 
diatribe,” The Japan That Can Say No.167 The connection between nationalist sentiment 
and the territorial dispute remains strong. When it was revealed in December 2001 that 
former Hokkaido MP Muneo Suzuki apparently made a comment to the effect that 
“return of the islands would be of no benefit at all to the nation,” he was widely criticized 
by former residents, constituents in Hokkaido, the Foreign Ministry, and even the Prime 
Minister himself.168 Ironically, Suzuki was often seen as the foremost advocate of the 
return of the islands. Yet one isolated comment led to nationwide criticism. Any 
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politician who promotes anything less than the return of all the Northern Territories can 
expect the same treatment. Such sentiment combined with weak national leaders offers 
little prospect of Japanese officials negotiating a compromise solution, especially as there 
is no political cost for continued stalemate.169 
1. Personal Interference in Inter-State Relations 
If the respective leaders did not have enough problems in attempting negotiations 
regarding the Northern Territories, they are further hampered by the interference of 
regional politicians in state-to-state relations. In Japan this phenomenon is mostly a result 
of the nature of Japanese politics and the internal workings of the LDP, which 
occasionally has acted in a way not dissimilar from the Communist parties of China and 
the Soviet Union in its mingling of “state” with “party” interests. In some instances, the 
use of out-of-office politicians has set government policy. For instance, former-Prime 
Minister Nakasone was appointed envoy to Russia in 1993 to conduct negotiations in the 
place of elected or officially appointed (and accountable) Japanese leaders.170 In general, 
this pattern has led to progress, as he was able to use his personal contacts and track 
record of trying to better Russo-Japanese relations to their advantage. For example, 
Nakasone was able to repair Russo-Japanese relationships following the two 
cancellations of the Yeltsin visit in 1993 through his ability to speak frankly with the 
Russian leader and to work out a mutually beneficial strategy for talks that would not 
undermine the domestic standing of the Japanese or Russian governments.171 However, 
the common use of unaccountable envoys may confuse issues, since they have no official 
negotiating powers and do not speak in an official capacity. 
There is a more sinister side to the involvement of “informal” actors in foreign 
policy, however, and that is the effect the kuromaku have on foreign policy negotiations. 
The kuromaku are Japanese politicians, often elected MPs but sometimes simply senior 
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LDP members, who operate behind the scenes and hold considerable power over 
governmental policies. Two notorious examples of this sort of politician are Shin 
Kanemaru and Muneo Suzuki, both of whom held undue influence in the MOFA. In 
1990, it was revealed Kanemaru had been holding talks on his own with a high Soviet 
official, Evgenii Primakov, regarding the Northern Territories.172 Kanemaru was arrested 
for influence-peddling in 1993, but one of his protégés, Muneo Suzuki, apparently soon 
took his place. Suzuki is an even better example, having declared many times “that the 
return of the Northern Territories was his ‘life’s work.’”173 Through bellicose actions and 
statements, Suzuki established a special sway over the MOFA. Sometimes Suzuki was a 
protector of the bureaucrats, as in the frequent rows between former-Foreign Minister 
Makiko Tanaka and Ministry officials. At other times, however, he would browbeat 
officials when he did not get his way, shouting or even physically assaulting them.174 His 
influence among the MOFA was well known to Russian diplomats, who allowed him to 
select the Russians who would be invited to Japan through a youth exchange program.175 
When Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov visited Tokyo in February 2002, he met with 
Suzuki for further discussions at the end of his official itinerary, and not Prime Minister 
Koizumi or Foreign Minister Kawaguchi.176 While Suzuki has been arrested for abuse of 
office, the problems of high level interference within the Japanese government still exist. 
It is possible that Suzuki was “offered up” by the LDP as a necessary sacrifice to placate 
public outrage after the dismissal of Tanaka, and not as a sincere attempt to curb abuses 
of authority.177 
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Russia has its own problems with intrusive politicians seeking to exert influence 
in inter-state relations. The current and former governors of the Far Eastern provinces of 
Primorskii Krai, Khabarovskii Krai and Sakhalin Oblast have all been willing 
contributors to the ongoing stalemate. One example is the governor of Khabarovskii Krai, 
Victor Ishaev. He has often traveled to promote wider regional integration within North-
East Asia. He has given speeches in South Korea highlighting the seemingly compatible 
comparative advantages possessed by Japan, China, Russia, and both North and South 
Korea and traveled to Japan as part of Putin’s entourage.178 However, his actions often 
suggest a semi-independent foreign policy different from that of Moscow, one that 
promotes different goals. Although he has come out against territorial transfers from 
Russia in the disputes with both China and Japan, he also apparently has a pragmatic side 
and at least recognizes that “The present government of Japan is in the [sic] difficult 
situation … Neither in Russia, nor in Japan the political situation has matured yet to 
decide the territorial problem.”179 His compatriots have been less helpful or 
understanding.  
Perhaps the most notorious of the Russian regional actors is the former governor 
of Primorskii Krai, Evgenii Nazdratenko, who is still trying to maintain some of his 
power in his current position as chairman of the Russian Fisheries Committee. Appointed 
by Yeltsin in 1993, Nazdratenko used a “nationalist theme and foreign policy issues to 
distract attention from the autocracy and economic collapse that … characterized his rule 
of the province.”180 Fashioning himself into the “defender of Russia’s Far-Eastern 
borders,” he has variously called for transfer of the Northern Territories to Primorskii 
Krai and threatened to dispatch his “Cossack” army to the islands to “defend” them from 
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the Japanese.181 It is possible his appointment to head the fisheries committee was a 
cover to move him out of Primorskii Krai where he could be more closely watched and in 
a position where he must promote Moscow’s interests.   
The successive governors of Sakhalin, while less extreme, have taken similar 
stands as Nazdratenko. Igor Farkhutdinov has followed similar policies as his predecessor 
and is a leading force in protests against Moscow whenever the islands are discussed. 
There are varied explanations for his positions: Kimura sees opposition in Sakhalin as a 
combination of a Soviet hangover among the oblast leadership, psychological insecurity 
over being bypassed in negotiations between Moscow and Tokyo, and a fear of losing a 
“means of eliciting economic cooperation [from Japan] indefinitely,”182 while Steven 
Solnick sees a combination of the familiar appeal to a domestic base and opposition as a 
“tactic for extracting greater economic resources or privileges from the federal 
government.”183 Regardless of his motives, Farkhutdinov apparently shares a concern 
with many of his constituents, which is that Moscow has neglected the Far East while 
exploiting it, and if Sakhalin is to prosper, more control over resource development 
projects must remain in the province. Protests over the islands may be the only way the 
Far East can get attention from Moscow. 
As for the rest of Russia, the Northern Territories hold symbolic value, but day-
to-day survival is often the more pressing concern. Additionally, greater economic 
integration with Japan is desired by all three current Far Eastern governors, regardless of 
their statements concerning the disputed territories. The dispute has been used 
extensively for political gain and to deflect attention from the disastrous economic 
conditions in the region, crumbling infrastructure, and general destitution of the 
population. The 4.9% increase in GDP from 2001 through 2002 (as measured by The 
Economist) has not significantly touched the Far East, which is one reason for the 
strength of nationalist sentiment in the region. Kimura attributes this to how “in many 
cases, people will identify with a strong state as a way of compensating for their lack of 
wealth … [and that] it’s not unusual to find the strongest nationalistic sentiments among 
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the very poorest of the poor.”184 Considering current conditions, the Northern Territories 
will continue to be a popular distraction for the populace in the foreseeable future. 
A similar situation exists in Japan, though the economy is not in such dire straits 
as Russia. The economy is, however, the most pressing issue, though there is no one in 
the government willing to take the necessary steps to reform the current system. Yet the 
problem with reforming the system, is that those who have benefited most are the ones 
still in power within the LDP.185 Koizumi came to power by promising reform, and he 
has been defeated in every attempt to implement his reforms. After ten years of economic 
stagnation, however, the Japanese public may not remain content with mere distractions. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT RELATIONS 
A. PROGRESS AND STALEMATE 
With Russian and Japanese public opinion, perceptions, myths, and politicians 
holding such diametrically opposed views on the Kuril issue, Russo-Japanese 
negotiations would seem to be deadlocked. However, since 1989, both sides have inched 
towards greater mutual cooperation. It can be argued that, with the exception of the 
resolution of the territorial dispute, most realistic near-term policy goals of both states are 
being accomplished. This has been especially true since 1997 when Japan officially 
adopted a “multi-layered approach” toward Russia, emphasizing expansion of areas of 
cooperation outside the boundaries of the Northern Territories issue.186 This increasing 
cooperation can easily be seen in the areas of fisheries, resource development, and 
environmental issues. Additionally, a start has been made on military-to-military 
relations, as well as some increased economic cooperation. However, as this chapter will 
argue, there is a limit to the amount of cooperation possible. The boundaries on 
cooperation are due in part to the territorial dispute. But, even without the Northern 
Territories issue, there are other constraints on the development of closer Russo-Japanese 
relations.  
B. COOPERATION VERSUS FRICTION 
Even before the Second World War, fisheries had already become the traditional 
issue of contention between the Russians and Japanese. During the 1920’s and 30’s, 
Japanese fishermen would regularly violate Soviet territorial waters while in the company 
of Imperial Navy warships. This tradition was reversed after the war, with the Soviets 
preventing Japanese fishermen from using many traditional fishing grounds, especially 
those surrounding the islands now called the “Northern Territories.” Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier, the primary economic value of the territories has nothing to do with 
mineral resources, but lies in the abundant sea life surrounding the islands. The Japanese 
are the largest per-capita consumers of fish in the world, and the loss of a major fishing 
area was felt almost immediately following the war, when Japan was plagued by severe 
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food shortages. Fisheries, therefore, became the first area in which Tokyo sought to 
establish cooperation with the Soviets after World War II.  While the first fishing 
negotiations in 1956 can hardly be called “cooperation,” Japanese concern over fishing 
rights has been the one consistent topic of diplomatic conversation between Russia and 
Japan. 187  
The waters around the Northern Territories have gradually been opened to 
Hokkaido fishermen, first through “private” arrangements for the collection of seaweed 
from around the Habomai islands through the most recent 1998 fishing accord. This was 
based upon a 1994 proposal by Nikolai Pogidin, head of the South Kuril District 
Administration, in which the two sides “decided to shelve the issue of jurisdiction” and 
agreed on fees to be paid “for the protection of marine resources.”188 Since then, the two 
states have increased their level of cooperation to include a ban on fishing by third 
countries, much to the chagrin of the South Koreans.189 The Japanese have also begun to 
buy fish roe (caviar) directly from Russia. Until 2002, the Japanese bought Russian fish 
roe from Russia through Norwegian brokers.190 Even this very pragmatic arrangement is 
surrounded by diplomatic face-saving measures, however. Rather than a straight-forward 
commercial transaction, the Japanese pay fees to Russia “in the name of protecting 
marine resources.” Also, only a limited number of Japanese fishing cooperatives 
participate.191  This means that poaching remains a major problem, as Russians attempt 
to control Japanese access to the fisheries. Many poachers operate with near impunity, 
using modern vessels that can easily outrun the deteriorating Russian coast guard boats 
that patrol the waters around the Northern Territories. Nor do the Japanese act firmly to 
prevent illegal fishing. As one Japanese writer noted: “A salmon is a salmon. There is no 
way of discerning which fish is caught where.”192 
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Environmental issues also play an increasing role in Russo-Japanese relations, as 
the Japanese are forced to confront the Soviet legacy of environmental devastation, 
especially with regards to radioactive waste. The issue was brought into the 
consciousness of the average Japanese when NHK broadcast a tape of the Russian tanker 
Amur, dumping liquid radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan. Japan has responded with 
increased economic assistance for the construction of a liquid radioactive waste 
processing facility located at the Zvezdochka shipyard in Primorskii Krai on the Sea of 
Japan coast.193 Otherwise, however, the Japanese have not shown a high level of interest 
in the environmental problems on their border, which is rather surprising given Japan’s 
experience at the end of World War II, and the ticking nuclear time bomb that lies just 
across the Sea of Japan.  
At least two spent nuclear reactors have been dumped into the Sea of Japan during 
the Soviet period, in addition to the liquid waste that has been repeatedly deposited in 
both the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk.194 In the post-Soviet period, the Russian 
Navy has had the responsibility of dismantling its decommissioned nuclear submarines. 
But because decommissioning efforts have to compete for scare funds with the 
operational fleet, they get low priority. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia has 
decommissioned approximately 160 nuclear submarines, just under half of which were in 
the Pacific Fleet. Even if decommissioning of nuclear ships were a priority, the Russian 
Navy does not have the funds properly to make these submarines safe. Most, in fact, are 
still sitting in the water awaiting surgery.195 The problem will only worsen with time as 
more submarines are decommissioned and waste storage tanks, already filled to capacity, 
can no longer absorb nuclear waste. The Mayak processing facility near Chelyabinsk, in 
Central Russia near Kazakhstan, is currently the only facility processing waste from 
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nuclear submarines. There is a tremendous backlog of material to be processed, and the 
facility itself is an environmental disaster.196 
Japanese disinterest may be explained by a cultural hesitance to deal with what is 
considered the faults of others. Admittedly, it is not only Japan that has failed effectively 
to engage the Russians on nuclear threat reduction issues. Most Europeans seem little 
concerned about Russia’s nuclear disposal problem all the more surprising given the 
panic produced by the Chernobyl’ nuclear reactor disaster of 1986. Despite stated 
willingness by President Putin to cooperate with other countries on the nuclear issue, 
ironically, only the United States has seriously and proactively engaged Russia in seeking 
to protect nuclear materials and assist in disposal,197 The events of September 11 should 
have been a wake up call to Japan that it should be worrying not only about 
environmental degradation, but also about terrorism. Regardless, the issue should be 
paramount to the Japanese, since any environmental damage to the Seas of Japan and 
Okhotsk could threaten a significant portion of Japan’s food supply. One American 
official in Tokyo summed up the Japanese attitude as follows: “Japan is like an ostrich 
with its head in the sand. It doesn’t react unless something comes and kicks it in the butt. 
Otherwise it pretends everything is fine.”198  
Resource development in the Far East is an area of relatively extensive and long 
lasting cooperation between Tokyo and Moscow, despite a lack of significant progress in 
the actual extraction of resources. In 1981, there were 5 planned projects ranging from 
forestry development to oil and natural gas extraction in the Far East and Sakhalin.199 By 
the end of the Cold War, only the natural gas development projects on Sakhalin remained 
(although two timber projects had been carried through), and these made slow progress 
from planning to extraction phases.200 Though the projects have just begun to come into 
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operations after many years, the deposits are considered extensive and may be able to 
provide a significant percentage of Japan’s natural gas needs in the future as well as lift 
the dismal regional economy.201 Whether these deposits will justify the extensive 
investment remains to be seen, however. As of the mid 1990’s, Japan had invested over 
$200 million in the various natural gas projects on Sakhalin, yet had not received “one 
tonne [sic] of oil or gas.”202 
Observers sometimes point out that the Japanese and Russian economies should 
complement each other. Traditionally, Japan has been poor in resources but rich in 
capital, while in Russia the situation is reversed. This was as true in the beginning of the 
20th century as it is at the onset of the 21st. Recently Victor Ishaev, the governor of 
Khabarovskii Krai in the Russian Far East, has argued that this situation makes greater 
economic integration within North-East Asia a logical step. In a March 2002 speech in 
Seoul, he attempted to show that each state in the region had different comparative 
advantages, and therefore the economies of China, Russia, Japan and both Koreas should 
move towards greater economic cooperation and integration. Japanese and South Korean 
capital could finance projects that utilized North Korean and Chinese manual labor, 
fueled by Russian energy and other natural resources, as well as scientific and 
engineering skill.203 Ishaev is especially convincing when he argues that energy 
consumption within the region will not decrease in the near term, and that the Russian Far 
East has an abundance of oil and gas deposits. However, his assumption that Japanese or 
even South Koreans will invest in Russian economic development is overly optimistic, 
especially when one considers the expense required to locate and exploit Russian energy 
sources. It remains cheaper and financially less risky to import oil from the Persian Gulf 
and elsewhere, although instability in the Middle East might change that calculation. 
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Throughout the 1990’s, Japan was accused of being indifferent to democratic 
transition in Russia by refusing to decouple economic aid from resolution of the Northern 
Territories dispute. Japan’s attitude has cost them significant political capital among their 
G-8 partners.204 However, many Japanese companies did invest in Russia beginning in 
the latter Gorbachev period and continuing through the first years after the demise of the 
Soviet Union, even though the Japanese government was stingy in granting economic 
assistance. Most of this investment came during the most chaotic period of Russia’s 
transition between 1991 and 1995, before the Russian economy found a level of relative 
stability following the devaluation of the ruble in 1998 and subsequent economic growth. 
As a consequence, practically all of the ventures and joint-ventures lost money or failed 
outright.205 In hindsight, the failure of the Japanese to provide official assistance appears 
to have demonstrated financial prudence, especially considering the significant capital 
flight from Russia since 1992, which continues to be estimated at around $1.5 billion per 
month.206 Since the mid 1990’s when most of the Japanese companies in Russia pulled 
out after being badly burned, there has been a marked hesitancy to risk an encore. One 
Japanese scholar, Toshiji Maeda, director of the Khabarovsk Japan Center, attributes this 
economic timidity to the fact that Japanese companies remain uninformed about the 
present economic and political situation in Russia. In Maeda’s view, there may be small 
and medium sized Russian businesses that are “investment worthy for Japan.”207 But 
while this may be true, other more important reasons keep Japanese capital out of Russia. 
From 1992 until 2002, the Japanese were the single largest donors of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) throughout the world.208 But Japan in 2002 is not the 
Japan of 1989, before the “bubble economy” burst. After more than a decade of recession 
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(actually, a series of four recessions), Japan’s economy continues to suffer from 
significant structural problems. Since 1989, the Japanese government debt has risen to 
nearly 140 percent of GDP (as of April 2002), the Nikkei 225 stock index has fallen by 
75 percent, unemployment is nearing the post-war high of 5.6 percent, corporate debt 
throughout Japan is estimated by Goldman Sachs to be around $1.5 trillion (as of 2000), 
and interest rates currently stand at 0.001 percent.209 Japan’s economic malaise combined 
with the better investment climate and generally better infrastructures in East and South 
East Asia have acted to prevent any serious investment in Russia since the 1998 
devaluation of the ruble. What investment capital exists has evidently been put into 
emerging Asian economies, where the Japanese are the single largest investors.210 
Among the major players in North East Asia – Japan, China, Russia, South Korea and the 
United States – Japanese trade with Russia remains miniscule. Trade with Russia 
currently amounts to approximately $5 billion, compared to $30 billion with the ROK, 
$80 billion with the PRC, and over $200 billion with the U.S.211 Therefore, the perceived 
risks of investing in Russia, rather than the “Northern Territories” issue, accounts for the 
low levels of trade between Russia and Japan.212 
The overall paucity of trade between Russia and Japan does not adequately 
explain the entire picture, however. While Russian trade matters little to Japanese in 
Tokyo, it is regionally significant for parts of Hokkaido. This is especially true in the 
areas around Otaru, Wakanai and Nemuro, where 20 percent of all trade with Russia 
occurs.213 While all of Japan has generally suffered economically during the 1990’s, 
Hokkaido with its agriculture-based economy has been hit harder than most of Japan.214 
In 2001, the unemployment rate in Hokkaido averaged 5.8 percent, compared to an 
average of 4.9 percent throughout Japan. Although Hokkaido is not as badly off as other 
regions such as Okinawa, which posted an average unemployment rate of 8.4 percent in 
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2001, the situation is still relatively bleak.215 Therefore, a volume of trade that would be 
considered insignificant elsewhere has a major impact in the coastal regions of Hokkaido. 
Officials in Hokkaido have argued for greater economic integration with the Russian Far 
East and Sakhalin as well as increased cultural exchanges in their efforts to assist Japan’s 
campaign for reversion of the disputed islands.216 The Russians in the Far East have 
desired greater ties as well, seeing in Japan the source of capital for badly needed 
infrastructure improvements. Despite military sales to China from Primorskii Krai, Japan 
remains the top destination for exports from the Russian Far East, mostly in the form of 
fish and natural resources.217  
The December 2000 visit of Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev to Tokyo 
marked a relatively significant improvement in relations between the two countries. This 
was the first-ever visit to Japan by a Russian or Soviet defense minister. It fulfilled 
pledges made at the 1997 Yeltsin-Hashimoto “no necktie summit” in Krasnoyarsk.218 
Since then there have been regular exchanges between the Russian military and the 
Japanese Self Defense Force. These have included mutual ship visits, search and rescue 
exercises and other confidence building measures and recently have included a Japanese 
proposal for cooperative mine-clearing operations in Afghanistan.219 Security 
cooperation between the two militaries is, however, still in a delicate phase. While the 
JSDF shifted from a Soviet invasion scenario in 1989 during the annual “Yama-Sakura” 
exercise, as recently as February 2001, the Russian Army conducted a major exercise 
simulating nuclear war with the United States. The “Cold War era” scenario posited a 
military conflict with the United States that escalated into global nuclear war and 
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included strikes on bases in Japan.220 Since the United States launched its “War on 
Terrorism” following the September 11, 2001 attacks, there are new alignments of 
interests between Russia and Japan. Russia’s new orientation will not necessarily result in 
increased cooperation with Japan on other security issues, although it would be in the 
interests of both states to use the situation to increase mutual trust.    
C. “FLOWERS WITHOUT ROOTS”221  
Relations between Russia and Japan are necessarily measured in centimeters, not 
kilometers. Inter-state relations between the two powers are currently at the closest level 
they have been since the 19th century. Yet the two nations are nearly as far away from 
signing a peace treaty in 2002 as they were in 1956. Although the territorial dispute 
seems like a minor issue to outside observers, it continues to have a disproportionate 
effect on Russo-Japanese cooperation. 
One Japanese scholar compared the current relative improvement of relations to 
flowers that have flourished without roots. “If there is not progress in the Northern 
Territories dispute the flowers won’t last long.”222 The problem that drives Russo-
Japanese diplomacy is that neither state has placed a real priority on improving relations 
– political, economic or otherwise – with the other. Another analogy compares Japan and 
Russia to backyard neighbors, with Russia’s “house” predominantly facing Europe and 
Japan’s facing Asia.223 The two must relate to each other, and neither desires conflict. 
But while there is a problem with their mutual “fence,” neither wishes to expend much 
effort to repair it. Despite all the friendly rhetoric, Japan and Russia expend little energy 
to achieve concrete results. 
Russians must always deal with the definition of their state. Is Russia a European 
or Asian state? Is it both, or is it neither? This conflict has often been termed by Robert 
Wesson the “Russian Dilemma” and the struggle between the two has been evident 
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throughout modern Russian history.224 Yet while Russia aspired to be a Pacific power 
since the time of Peter the Great, plans for development have never achieved reality. In 
2002 the vast majority of Russians live west of the Ural Mountains, and Siberia and the 
Russian Far East remain a sparsely populated area with a rapidly declining population. 
Russians have a lower life expectancy than Pakistanis, and the birth rate per woman is 
down to 1.17, far below the 2.14 necessary to maintain a stable population, and by some 
estimates it could drop below 1.0.225  
The main Asian concern of most Russians is not Japan, but China and the 
perceived threat of massive Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East. The real 
number of Chinese living in Russia is heavily disputed, but estimates range from 200,000 
to 450,000, and projections based on recent migration trends show this number “could 
grow to several million by mid century.”226 The shadow economy that exists between 
Russia and China has been of growing concern to both the Russians and Chinese, and at 
least some policy makers on both sides have recognized the need to bring both unofficial 
immigration and illicit trade under control. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji estimated the 
illicit trade a approximately $10 billion – nearly as much as legal trade between the two 
states.227 The “strategic partnership” signed in 2001 between Russia and China is 
probably more an attempt by the two states to cooperate on bilateral problems ranging 
from trade to minor border disputes along the 4000 km long border and less an alliance 
aimed at the United States or Japan.228 This “partnership” makes sense when seen in the 
context of Russia’s traditional desire to maintain relatively benign buffer states on its 
borders. However, The Economist notes the partnership “has an edge to it,” and while 
cooperation is increasing between the two, China is as worried about possible Russian 
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intentions as those of the United States. The Chinese remain concerned that Putin has 
expressed interest in a new strategic relationship with Washington and wonder about his 
support for regional missile defense systems.229  
Also, the relations with the Korean peninsula rank above resolving the “Northern 
Territories” dispute with Japan on Russian list of diplomatic priorities. Russia has 
established itself as one of the four major players in relations between North and South 
Korea, the others being the United States, China and Japan. Russia still has some 
influence over the Kim Jong-Il regime that the Soviet Union once sponsored. Although 
Russia receives little to no economic benefit from its relations with the DPRK (which still 
owes $3.8 billion for previous arms sales), the diplomatic influence with that hermit 
regime enables Russia to maintain a claim to global involvement.230 South Korea is seen 
as an emerging economic partner, and plans exist for connection of a Trans-Korean rail 
line to the Trans-Siberia rail line if the DPRK and ROK follow through on their 
agreement on the Korean link.231 At the minimum, stability on the Korean Peninsula is 
considered by Russian policy makers to be necessary for continued Russian participation 
in Asian cooperative frameworks.232 
President Putin stated in his address to the Russian Federal Assembly in 2001 that 
Russia must “promote its participation in cooperative mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific 
region and expand friendship and cooperation with leading Asian countries.”233 
However, according to Japanese scholars, Russia often seems eager to join track-1 and 
track-2 Asian cooperative organizations, but then fails to dispatch appropriately high 
level delegates or show much interest in the organization once it becomes a member.234 
This proved to be the case when Russia sought entry into the Pacific Economic 
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Cooperation Council, a track-2 organization whose secretariat functions are performed by 
JIIA. Russia lobbied hard to get into the organization ostensibly to further regional 
economic integration with the Russian Far East. But since it has joined, Moscow has 
barely participated.235 While this is only one organization, and cannot be assumed to be 
representative of all Russian multilateral engagements in the Pacific, it does fit within a 
general pattern of Russian lack of interest in organizations they do not control.  
Although its policies are still partially prisoner to memories of the Second World 
War, Japan does not have an identity crisis on the scale of that of Russia. Since the days 
of post-World War II reconstruction, Japan has defined its interests primarily in 
economic terms, leaving its security to be guaranteed by its alliance with the United 
States. Relations with Washington are the highest priority among Japanese policy 
makers, as the United States is both guarantor of Japan’s security and its largest trading 
partner, absorbing over 30 percent of Japanese exports.236 After solid U.S.-Japan 
relations, the Japanese generally desire stability within Asia. North Korea is seen as the 
only real threat to Japanese security, a fact the North Koreans seem determined to not let 
the Japanese forget.237 China is the rising economic competitor that could overtake 
Japan’s place as the largest economy (by GDP) in Asia if China maintains its current 
growth rates and Japan remains mired in its economic slump. Japan has been the largest 
single investor in Asia since 1993, and has made efforts to take a leadership role in 
regional multilateral organizations.238   
Relations with Russia do not readily fit within the overall scheme of Japanese 
foreign policy. The territorial dispute remains the core impediment to better relations, 
which is an indication of the low level of importance placed on Russo-Japanese relations 
by the Japanese political leadership. In the estimation of both American officials in Japan 
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and Japanese scholars, policy towards Russia has been left to the bureaucrats in the 
MOFA to determine.239 The net effect is that Japan’s Russia policy is rudderless. Part of 
the problem is that there is still no consensus on Russia’s role within North East Asia in 
the post-Cold War era. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a profound effect on the 
security structure of North East Asia, as simultaneously a main backer of Pyongyang 
disappeared, the Sino-Soviet split ceased to exist, and the Soviet threat of invasion (for 
Japan) dissolved almost overnight. Regional security had been based on patron-client 
relationships within the area, with Japan and South Korea sharing a quasi alliance based 
on their common ally the United States.240 There has not been a credible attempt to 
redefine the security environment within Asia since 1992, as the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or an enlarged NATO and Partnership for 
Peace program have attempted to accomplish in Europe. The Asian Pacific Economic 
Conference (APEC) has occasionally served the purpose of encouraging general 
dialogue, but there is still no regional framework for cooperation.  
During the Cold War, Soviet-Japanese relations were essentially a function of 
Soviet-U.S. relations. During that time the Northern Territories dispute served a purpose 
of bringing the United States and Japan into closer alignment. Since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Japan and Russia have only managed to agree to base their talks on the 1956 Joint 
Declaration that reestablished diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tokyo. Since 
1992, there have been five summit meetings between Russian and Japanese political 
leaders. At the first, between Yeltsin and then-Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in 
October 1993, the Tokyo Declaration was issued stating the dispute should be resolved 
on the “basis of law and justice.”241 It took another four years before a second summit 
meeting could be arranged, this time between Ryūtarō Hashimoto and Yeltsin at 
Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. That summit, known also as the “no-necktie summit” 
because of the informal and relaxed relationship between Hashimoto and Yeltsin, resulted 
                                                 
239 American Embassy Tokyo, Interview; Hasegawa, Neither War nor Peace, 543. 
240 Victor Cha defines a quasi alliance as “the relationship between two states that remain unallied 
despite sharing a common ally.” The two states may “share a common threat and common great-power 
protector but are affected by alliance hindrances (historical animosity).” For more on the Japan-ROK quasi 
alliance, see Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle 
(Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1999).  
241 Hasegawa, Neither War Nor Peace, 484-485. 
68 
in a pledge that the two states would attempt to conclude a peace treaty by December 
2000.242 The Krasnoyarsk summit was partly the result of the new Japanese 
“multilayered approach” announced in January 1997 in which Hashimoto sought to 
reduce the influence of the Northern Territories on Japan’s Russian policy. The summit 
marked the initiation of a “three principles approach” to peace based on “trust, mutual 
interests and a long-term prospective.”243 Cordial meetings followed in 1998 first in 
Kawana, Japan and then in Moscow when a new Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, became 
the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Moscow in 25 years. Progress was made in 
fisheries and expansion of the visa-free travel, but little was done effectively to address 
the territorial issue.244 Relations then came to a virtual standstill as Putin replaced Yeltsin 
as interim president on the eve of 2000. When Putin came to Tokyo in September 2000, it 
was clear that no peace treaty would be signed by the Hashimoto-Yeltsin “deadline.” 
Relations had not soured, but they were no longer progressing on the issue of a peace 
treaty. At the Irkutsk summit in March 2001, Putin reaffirmed the 1956 Joint Declaration, 
but as  no more than an “in-depth exchange of views regarding peace treaty issues” could 
be decided upon.245 The weakness of lame-duck Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori was no 
doubt partially responsible, as before attending the summit he announced he would resign 
as Prime Minister. 
The stalemate continued as the Japanese attempted to clarify their position in July 
2002, rejecting the “two-track” approach that had promoted in parallel to the official 
“multilayered approach” by the aforementioned MP Muneo Suzuki as well as some in the 
MOFA.246 By that plan, Shikotan and the Habomais would be returned in the near-term 
after which a peace treaty could be signed, with the understanding negotiations would 
continue regarding Kunashiri and Etorofu. However, the new “clarified” position only 
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returns to the traditional line that the territorial dispute must be resolved before a peace 
treaty may be signed without offering any new propositions to resolve the dispute.247 
Despite the continued stalemate on territorial issues, Japan is continuing the Hashimoto 
“multi-layered approach” and is encouraging engagement with Russia in economic, 
environmental and cultural fields.248 The “multi-layered approach” has served to lessen 
mutual distrust among policy-makers while enabling the recent cooperation mentioned 
earlier in the chapter, though continued lack of progress makes it unlikely Putin and 
current Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi will hold another summit until early 2003.  
The Northern Territories dispute provides an interesting paradox in the realm of 
international relations. While several Japanese scholars and American officials believe 
that the dispute has little practical effect on Russo-Japanese relations, it is also seen as the 
great limiting factor in diplomatic progress.249 From the Japanese side, despite the fact 
that no formal connection is acknowledged, there is a general recognition that relations in 
non-political areas are still partially linked to resolution of the dispute. There may be 
another reason for this attitude: Japan may have already reached the furthest extent of 
cooperation with Russia that it desires. Russia for many years has looked to Japan for 
help in developing its Far Eastern infrastructure and industry. But it is unrealistic to 
expect Japanese industries or the Japanese government would commit large amounts of 
capital to Russian economic development even if a peace treaty were signed unless 
investment was made part of the negotiation process. While some deputies in the Russian 
Duma have proposed selling the islands to Japan for as much as $2.5 trillion – a sum 6 
and a half times greater than Russia’s GDP – the official position of both governments 
remains intractable, which leaves little room for compromise.250 Japan refuses to 
consider any alternative short of a return of Japanese sovereignty over all four islands, 
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while Russia continually insists the Japanese abandon “extreme demands,” a catch-phrase 
referring to the Japanese request for the return of all the islands.251 
One major reason the territorial dispute will continue for the foreseeable future is 
that continued stalemate offers the safer political course to both sides than does any 
conceivable compromise. As discussed in chapter IV, domestic politics in both countries 
is a major determinant of policy concerning the disputed islands. Without compromising 
their respective positions, the Russians and Japanese have found ways to cooperate that 
skirt the sovereignty issues, yet accomplish basic the goals of each country. Through the 
visa-free exchange visits inaugurated in 1992, many former Japanese residents have been 
able to return to the islands to pay their respects to the dead. According to Hokkaido 
Prefecture Government statistics, 3,543 Japanese visited the islands from 1992 to 
September 2001.252 For Russia, there has been some economic investment by the 
Japanese in the Russian Far East as well as some small joint development projects on the 
islands themselves beyond just humanitarian aid. However, as the Allison study notes, 
“Because the matter is essentially symbolic, there are few advocates of an immediate 
resolution that would entail any compromise, while many support a stand on principle, 
whatever the consequences … There is no political cost for a stand on principle that 
demands four islands and gets nothing.”253 
D. IF THE FLOWERS HAD ROOTS 
While there is considerable cooperation now between Japan and Russia on many 
fronts, especially considering the glacial rate of progress that had been typical throughout 
the Cold War, there is still much that Japan and Russia have to gain from full 
normalization of relations. Masato Kimura and David Welch in particular highlight how 
the “ultimate victim” of the islands dispute has been Japanese foreign policy and world 
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standing, and that “Japan is not [rationally] maximizing anything in seeking their 
return.”254 However, the Russians have gained nothing themselves through their 
intransigence on the issue and their failure to seriously examine one of the lasting 
legacies of Stalin’s foreign and domestic policy for the Soviet Union. Russia is in a 
position for the foreseeable future where it needs the Japanese more than the Japanese 
need Russia. Japan is slowly – albeit painfully – transitioning from an industrial export-
based economy to a service based economy. Though many Japanese worry about the 
migration of their factories to South East Asia and China, these movements “merely 
reflect the fact that Japan is a mature economy that should be turning to service 
products.”255  
With the possible exception of energy resources, Japan no longer needs what 
Russia’s has most to offer: natural resources. However, if Russia expects regional 
assistance in developing the Far East, Japan is the only state that could help. South Korea 
must strengthen itself and save for the day when it must finance the reconstruction of the 
North in a united Korea. The Koreans have no doubt watched the example of Germany 
and the pain reunification caused the strongest economy in Europe. Neither can Russia 
expect help from China. China is itself practically two separate countries consisting of the 
developed coast and the undeveloped interior. Although the Chinese economy is growing 
rapidly, prosperity has not reached the interior. Even some of its “modern cities” are mere 
edifices – Qingdao, for example, looks like a modern city with an impressive skyline 
from offshore until one gets into the city and notices that many of the grandiose buildings 
are only half complete, unoccupied and construction has apparently ceased.256 It is 
unlikely China will be willing to contribute to construction in Russia when there is much 
to do within China itself. Excusing China and South Korea leaves Japan as the only 
possible or likely source of capital for long-term infrastructure and economic 
development in the Far East. 
The greatest benefit resolution of the “Northern Territories” dispute will bring is 
the full normalization of relations between the Russian Federation and Japan. The dispute 
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is the last remaining issue left from the Second World War. Although it does not seem to 
matter much in the context of everyday relations between Japan and Russia, it has a 
poisoning effect on mutual perceptions. The rhetoric recalls historical injustices 
stretching back to the time before Japan was a modern state and Russia was still ruled by 
the tsars. Closure of this episode would release Russo-Japanese relations from the 
stranglehold that has been placed upon them. All the Japanese scholars interviewed by 
the author have concluded that the “lack of a treaty creates a limit” in how much the 
Japanese are willing to cooperate with Russia, even if they disagree about whether that 
limit has been reached.257  
For Russia, the greatest prospective benefit is the possibility of greatly expanded 
economic assistance.  Japan’s “multilayered approach” has already resulted in “more than 
$6 billion in credits and investment” and reduced Japanese government interference in 
private investment.258 If the mental limit is removed, however, the amount of aid can be 
expected to increase as the Japanese would take more seriously the integration of the 
Russian Far East into the North East Asian economy. The model most appealing to 
Russia would be Sino-Japanese relations in the period following normalization of 
relations between Japan and the PRC in 1972. In the 15 years following normalization, 
trade increased from $1.1 billion to $15.6 billion by 1987, and has since skyrocketed to 
$80 billion. In the same period, China became the “single biggest recipient of Japanese 
aid.”259 Although aid to Russia for many reasons would not reach this amount, Japan has 
been generous in the past with aid to countries with which it had been at war. The PRC, 
Taiwan and the ROK have all been recipients of Japanese aid following normalization of 
relations, although this record may lead the Russians to expect far more than the Japanese 
are willing to provide, and it must be noted these nations also received the brunt of 
Japanese aggression between 1905 and 1945. Additionally, increased economic aid may 
only come if the dispute is resolved in Japan’s favor and most or all of the islands are 
returned to Japanese sovereignty. However, it must be noted that much of the 
development aid Japan has already provided has either been unutilized or mismanaged. 
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One report indicates that of the 4.38 billion yen ($37.1 million) allotted in Fiscal Year 
1999, “only about 550 million yen has actually been spent.”260  
Japan will also gain from resolution of its dispute with Russia. Perhaps the 
greatest possible benefit could be Russian support for Japan’s desire to become the sixth 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, although that would also 
probably require repealing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, another politically 
difficult task.261 Additionally, it would lessen the impact of the Sino-Russian “strategic 
partnership” on Japanese security by removing the primary source of conflict between 
Russia and Japan. Japan and Russia have many common interests within North East Asia, 
not the least of which is stability on the Korean Peninsula. As long as the territorial 
dispute exists, cooperation in security issues cannot fully progress and no long-term 
security regime can be developed in the region.  
Unfortunately, the prognosis for resolution of the territorial dispute is slim given 
the current internal domestic political situations in both Russia and Japan. President Putin 
himself pointed to the heart of the dispute when he said in a press conference, “The most 
important thing is the status of the people who believe that this territory is their 
homeland, those who consider it to be their homeland after the Second World War, and 
those who considered it to be their homeland before the Second World War.”262 Two 
separate groups of people consider the islands to be their rightful home, a situation not 
unlike the one at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both groups have support of 
the majority of their respective populations, though the symbolism surrounding the 
                                                 
260 “Russian Aid Group Fails to Spend Funds Provided by Japan,” Asahi Shimbun, 30 July 2002, FBIS 
Doc ID JPP20020730000055. 
261 “East, West, Home’s Best,” 13; Article 9 was written by Gen. Douglas MacArthur to prevent Japan 
from ever using military force abroad. The article reads in part, “the Japanese people forever renounce war 
as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
… The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”[qtd. in Appendix IV of Hugh Borton, 
Japan’s Modern Century (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), 493]. Current interpretation holds this article 
prevents Japan from engaging its right to collective self-defense. The article still maintains widespread 
domestic popularity, though new interpretations have allowed Japan to engage in peacekeeping and non-
conflict operations. Some critics allege Japan should not be allowed to join the Permanent Security Council 
as long as they are unwilling to fully commit their forces in support of U.N. mandated operations that may 
involve armed conflict, such as the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War against Iraq. Although the Japanese have 
interpreted their constitution to allow for some peacekeeping roles, there are strict prohibitions on the use 
of Japanese forces in any role that could potentially involve armed conflict. 
262 “Russia: President Putin Gives News Conference for Domestic, Foreign Press,” trans. FBIS, 
transcript of live Russian TV RTR press conference, 18 July 2001, FBIS Doc. ID CEP20010718000297. 
74 
dispute overpowers thoughts of the actual people involved. Unless a drastic change in 
either the internal or external environment occurs, the benefits of resolution are not yet 
great enough for politicians in Russia or Japan to make the necessary compromises that 
could lead to a peace treaty and final settlement. 
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VI. WHAT CONDITIONS MIGHT SHIFT THE PARADIGM? 
Japan and Russia have reached a diplomatic impasse over the Northern 
Territories, essentially because this has become a hot domestic issue in both countries, 
neither of which possesses the statesman-like leadership to resolve. Given current 
conditions, external and internal, continued stalemate is the most likely outcome for the 
foreseeable future. Domestic concerns have made governments in Japan and Russia wary 
of being seen to give in on the issue, lest they lose face and be forced from office. In both 
Japan and Russia, legislative approval is required for the ratification of any treaty. Given 
the multi-party nature of each assembly and the fragility of government coalitions, 
neither the Russian nor the Japanese government is willing to risk making itself 
vulnerable on an issue of such seemingly marginal importance. For a peace treaty to be 
signed that will settle the ownership of the Northern Territories, a significant change must 
occur in the nature of Russo-Japanese relations. This does not mean a slight change in 
strategy, as was the “multilateral approach” forwarded by then-Prime Minister 
Hashimoto in 1997, or the acceptance of the 1956 accord by President Putin in 2001. 
Rather, the resolution of the Northern Territories dispute will require a fundamental 
alteration in Russo-Japanese relations.  
At the heart of the problem is the symbolism surrounding the territorial dispute. 
Each nation views the Northern Territories issue in an overly emotional context. This will 
continue until the imagery of World War II softens, until possession of the islands is 
established on rational geographic, strategic and economic criteria, and no longer equated 
with the idea of victory or humiliation in war. This may not occur until the death of the 
World War II generation and the gradual fading of historical memory allows the issue to 
be approached in a relatively rational manner, shorn of the emotional baggage of living 
memory. A return to economic prosperity in both Hokkaido and the Russian Far East 
would also help this process along. People who have their economic needs met are less 
likely to be swayed by those who have nothing to offer but nationalistic rhetoric. 
However, both of these factors will take time – possibly generations – because historical 
memories do not quickly fade and economic prosperity is unlikely to return quickly to 
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these remote and depressed regions. For the Northern Territories dispute to be 
approached by both parties in a more detached manner, there must first be a change in the 
value placed on bilateral relations by the popular opinion in each country. Authors 
Graham Allison, Hiroshi Kimura and Konstantin Sarkisov concluded in a study published 
over a decade ago: “The need for an intermediary to break the impasse and help both 
nations see the larger interests in this issue is apparent. ... If there is to be a resolution in 
the near future, a third party will have to play a major role in transforming the dispute 
into a positive sum game in which the parties can find a mutually-acceptable compromise 
that serves the larger interests of all.”263 
The first segment of this chapter will outline possible scenarios that may convince 
the Russians and Japanese that their interests are best served through normalization and 
possible alliance, as opposed to prolonging the past legacy of disagreement and 
antagonism. At the end of the chapter, the implications for regional security will be 
assessed in terms of opposed scenarios of resolution or non-resolution of the Northern 
Territories dispute.  
A. EXTERNAL STIMULI 
Although they are neighbors, Russo-Japanese relations have often been propelled 
by influences of third party intervention in the region. For instance, Russian intervention 
in the Pacific in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in great part from 
competition with Britain and the United States. The Meji Restoration in Japan was 
sparked by the realization that Japan had to modernize or it would share the fate of 
Ch’ing Dynasty China, bullied and ultimately dismembered by outside powers. Indeed, it 
was the competition sparked by the implosion of China in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century China, a break-up hastened by European intervention, that created the conditions 
for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. The Treaty of Portsmouth that ended this war 
was negotiated between the two belligerents by President Theodore Roosevelt. Stalin 
entered the Pacific War at the insistent urging of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who wanted an 
ally to aid in the invasion of Japan. But Stalin, too, sought to avenge the Russian 
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humiliation of 1904-1905, recoup Russian primacy in Korea and Sakhalin, and establish a 
sphere of influence in Manchuria. Following the war, both the Soviets and the United 
States formulated their relations with Tokyo in a Cold War context.  
Given the history of third party influence on the Northern Territories issue, the 
assumption of this chapter is that the international environment must change to create 
conditions to move a resolution forward. The first, and most likely, evolution is that the 
emergence of China as a potential regional hegemon. This may drive Russia and Japan 
closer together, and cause them to put this rather minor dispute behind them in the 
interests of greater cooperation against a potential strategic and economic threat. 
1. Hostile China 
After a “Century of Humiliation,” Chinese power may finally achieve the 
economic and political potential that many have predicted for it at least since Franklin D. 
Roosevelt pushed for Chinese membership on the Permanent Security Council in 1945. 
Between 1990 and 1998, average economic growth in China has been estimated at 11.2 
percent, and in the past year it has managed a respectable 8 percent growth.264 As a 
consequence, all governments are trying to adjust to the emergence of a rising Chinese 
regional, perhaps even global power. As mentioned earlier, Russia has chosen to enter a 
“strategic partnership” with China in the 2001 China-Russian “Treaty of Good-
Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation.” Something less than a full strategic 
alliance, the new partnership can be viewed as a bid to “stem support for a unipolar world 
with the United States as the only superpower.”265 The partnership is necessary for the 
Chinese military in its modernization efforts, as most of the People’s Liberation Army’s 
(PLA) equipment is based on old Soviet armaments. Two articles in the treaty strengthen 
ties between Russia and China through cooperation in “military technology, scientific 
technology, energy, nuclear power, aerospace technology” which the PLA requires to 
allow its forces to at least be competitive with those of the United States in some selected 
sectors.266 Following the demise of the Soviet Union, many in the United States have 
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come to view China as an emerging military threat, or at the very least, as President 
George W. Bush labeled it, a “strategic competitor.”  
Chinese military funding for modernization has increased dramatically in the past 
several years, and while the technological level of their most modern forces is still 
significantly behind the United States, closer cooperation with Russia and increased arms 
purchases may quickly reduce that gap. China sees itself as the natural hegemon in Asia 
based on its historical primacy and cultural influence throughout the long duration of its 
existence. However, a gradual increase in Chinese power is unlikely to alarm the 
Russians, though it may worry the Japanese. Despite China’s modernization plan for the 
PLA, the current focus remains on economic development. While China may eventually 
develop into the strongest regional power overall, current leaders are unlikely to do 
anything that would seriously affect their economy.   
Yet China, for all its economic growth is not necessarily a stable state. Many of 
the assumptions regarding China’s rising power seem to be based on straight-line 
projections: that China will maintain high levels of economic growth indefinitely, that the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will maintain its hold on political power, and that China 
will not face any significant internal upheavals. However, there are significant dangers 
inherent in straight-line projection. China’s governmental and decision-making structures 
are not transparent and rule by the CCP has not produced a regulated method of 
transferring power from one set of rulers to another. The current tremors regarding 
whether Jiang Zemin would gracefully step aside and the confusion over when the 16th 
Communist Party Congress would be held show this defect in orderly power transfer.267 
Minxin Pei, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
writing about the decline of the Chinese Communist Party has referred to contemporary 
China as a cross between the “political stagnation” in the Soviet Union under Leonid 
Brezhnev with the “crony capitalism” in Indonesia under Suharto, noting that “pervasive 
corruption, a collusive local officialdom, elite cynicism, and mass disenchantment … are 
the classic symptoms of degenerating governing capacity.”268 The real danger from 
China is not a steady rise in regional power, but political fragmentation and internal 
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collapse leading to the emergence of a hostile regime. This scenario would seriously 
concern both Russia and Japan. 
The CCP has lost its credibility among many in China because of official 
corruption, and the Party itself has lost much of its ability to mobilize the population.269 
Minxin Pei notes, “Increasingly, when faced with direct challenges to its authority, the 
CCP can rely only on repression rather than public mobilization to counter its 
opponents.”270 If Chinese leaders attempt serious political reform to redress the 
contradictions within their system, there is no guarantee of success. There can be no 
doubt that Chinese leaders are ever mindful of the fact that no Leninist-style party has 
survived attempts at political reform. 
If the CCP were to collapse amidst social tensions, there is no guarantee of what 
system might arise. Establishment of democracy in China cannot be a forgone 
conclusion. Rather, considering how the CCP has managed effectively to limit the 
formation of any large-scale or coordinated opposition, democracy is probably not a 
likely outcome. In a worst-case scenario, if the PLA took power and chose to pursue a 
confrontational path against its neighbors, Russia could only look to Japan and the United 
States to secure its interests. If Russia felt the Chinese military required balancing, and 
the Japanese felt threatened by increased Chinese militarism, a hostile China could 
provide a necessary stimulus for Russian and Japanese leaders to solve their territorial 
dispute in the interests of national security. John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of Political 
Science at the University of Chicago, has suggested that Japan “would not dare 
challenge” a militarily powerful China.271 This line of reasoning, however, ignores the 
larger dynamic of Chinese-Japanese relations over several centuries that has shown Japan 
more than willing to resist Chinese domination. While it may be true Japan could not 
overpower Chinese military might in a land battle on the Asian continent, the Japanese do 
possess the 3rd largest military in the Asian-Pacific area.272  
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In this scenario, Japan and Russia would be forced towards closer cooperation in 
coordination with the United States to “contain” China. Russians are keenly aware of 
increased Chinese migration into Siberia, and many see it as a threat to Russian 
security.273 Likewise, the Japanese have had territorial disputes of their own with the 
Chinese, and China could affect the Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC) upon which 
Japan depends for trade and oil. The Northern Territories would thus cease to be a 
marginal issue, because Russo-Japanese relations would be a higher priority in both 
countries than each state’s bilateral relations with China. Additionally, it would be in 
U.S. interests to push for resolution to bring Russia and Japan closer together because no 
security regime that sought to contain China would be successful without Japanese and 
Russian participation. U.S. negotiators or intermediaries could then play a secondary role 
of deflecting or preventing a domestic backlash against either Russian or Japanese leaders 
by making arguments that resolution was required by all in the interest of national 
interests and security.  
2. Disruption of Oil 
A second scenario that may induce closer Russo-Japanese cooperation could be a 
prolonged conflict in the Persian Gulf. The Japanese currently receive approximately 80 
percent of their oil from Persian Gulf states, with most of the rest coming from Indonesia 
and none coming from Russia.274 As anti-Saddam rhetoric heats up in Washington and 
U.S. troops continue operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the 
Japanese have been keen to maintain cordial relations with the oil-exporting Gulf States, 
especially Iran.275 Additionally, like the United States, the Japanese maintain a strategic 
oil reserve currently totaling 315 million barrels to ensure that energy supplies are not 
disrupted by a short-term conflict or embargo.276 However, if the region was to become 
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seriously destabilized and production or delivery substantially disrupted for an extended 
period of time, Japan would need to find other sources of oil. Russia is perhaps the only 
country that could offset a drop or halt in Saudi production. Russia’s 48.6 billion barrels 
in reserves are not nearly as great as the 264.2 billion barrels in reserves – more than 25 
percent of the world’s total – that the Saudis control.  But they do represent 
approximately 5 per cent of the world’s known reserves.277 During Soviet times, Russia 
exported approximately 12 million barrels of oil a day and was the world’s leading oil 
exporter.278 Russia now produces approximately 5 million barrels per day and its oil 
companies are pouring investment back into infrastructure and exploration as well as 
engaging in more partnerships with foreign oil companies.279 Sakhalin, for example, is 
estimated to have reserves of approximately 3.3 billion barrels of oil within fields 
currently under development, and developers hope to provide a significant percentage of 
Japan’s oil requirements.280  
Japan has reduced its oil consumption since 2000, partially through greater 
efficiency and partially because of the latest economic recession and corresponding drop 
in industrial demand. Japanese consumption of 5.4 million barrels per day is expected to 
remain steady or fall slightly, and the Japanese have been attempting to diversify their oil 
imports to rely less on the Middle East, although so far they have had little success in 
doing so.281 The Japanese have begun financing oil exploration and extraction in the 
Caspian Sea through arrangements with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but they have so far 
remained cool to the prospect of oil deliveries from Russia.282 The reason for this may be 
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the failure of early Japanese investment in Russia during the first years of the Yeltsin 
administration coupled with the low return on investment and long duration of the joint 
development projects in Sakhalin.  
Despite current Japanese reservations of dealing with Russia, if the Japanese oil 
supply were seriously disrupted or deemed unreliable, only Russia has the excess 
production capacity that could meet current Japanese demands. Such a situation is not 
unthinkable. If the United States attacks Iraq and the Iraqis respond with attacks on oil 
production facilities on the Arabian Peninsula, as they did with the Kuwaiti oil fields in 
1991, then Japan would be forced to turn to Russia. Russia could then use oil as leverage 
to secure a favorable resolution of the Northern Territories dispute and sign a peace treaty 
that required them to return only Shikotan and the Habomais.  
3. Russia in NATO 
The third scenario that could sufficiently change the paradigm upon which Russo-
Japanese relations are based is Russian accession into the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary entered NATO in the 
first round of post-Cold War expansion. The event was unthinkable only a decade before, 
when the impending collapse of the Soviet Union was not considered a serious possibility 
by experts. Many Soviet specialists were caught by surprise and, in one unlucky act of 
timing, Alvin Rubenstein of the University of Pennsylvania saw his book on active Soviet 
foreign policy go into print after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The final section of 
Rubenstein’s the book is entitled: “The Future of Soviet-American Relations and Soviet 
Strategy Beyond the Year 2000.”283 The point of this illustration is to demonstrate that 
Russia’s relations with NATO have often defied even expert prediction. 
U.S. opponents of NATO expansion have frequently invoked potential effects 
from enlargement on Russia, fearing instability within Russia itself or instability caused 
by Russia in countries on its border.284 Yet before new members had even joined, the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in 1997. This gave the Russians a presence in 
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NATO through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). In May 2002, Russia 
was integrated further into NATO’s structures through the creation of the NATO-Russia 
Council, which replaced the PJC. Russia’s role increased, as a press release noted: “In the 
framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as 
equal partners in areas of common interest.”285 Russia, therefore, has gained a place as a 
de facto member in NATO. However, the point here is not to examine the arguments 
against full Russian integration into all of NATO’s political and military structures, but to 
ponder the changes that Russian membership and the accession process might bring to 
the North East Asian security situation and its impact on Russo-Japanese relations in the 
event the United States seriously pushed for full membership of Russia in NATO. 
NATO already has one member whose interests span the globe: the United States. 
Were Russia to join NATO, the alliance would wrap around the entire northern 
hemisphere and could significantly change the entire security situation in North East 
Asia. Most prominently, Russia and Japan would enter into a quasi-alliance similar to 
that between Korea and Japan because both Russia and Japan would be bound by a 
bilateral security relationship with the United States. If Russia could simultaneously 
maintain some form of its “strategic partnership” with China so that the Chinese did not 
feel that a greatly expanded NATO alliance including Russia was directed against them, 
security in North East Asia could stabilize. Japan and Russia working in conjunction 
could possibly improve the environmental security situation through greater coordination 
in the protection of marine resources. However, such an alliance could also have a 
temporarily destabilizing effect if China viewed the new relationship as being a form of 
containment. In that case, the first scenario could come arise through a self-fulfilling 
prophesy: China being treated as a threat by the United States, Russia and Japan could 
easily become a threat. 
Some Japanese scholars support the entry of Russia into NATO, and even argue 
that Japan should do what it can to promote Russian entry. In at least one way, Japanese 
interests could be well served: the NATO Handbook outlines among the requirements for 
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membership that: “Aspirant countries are expected to achieve certain goals in the 
political and economic fields. These include settling any international, ethnic or external 
territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law 
and human rights; establishing democratic control of their armed forces; and promoting 
stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice and environmental 
responsibility.”286 Therefore the argument follows that Japan should simultaneously 
promote Russian accession to NATO while requesting the United States to apply pressure 
to Russia to conclude a peace treaty with Japan that returns the Northern Territories.287 
The reasoning is that only through resolution of the territorial dispute with Japan could 
Russian integration into NATO provide greater security in the Asian Pacific, otherwise 
the “U.S. would be in an awkward situation.”288  
4. No Guarantee 
The three scenarios presented above are not impossible, though the situations may 
be improbable. The last decade of the 20th century proved, however, that the world can 
change faster than the commentators who study it expect. The only thing that is unlikely 
in Russo-Japanese relations is that the necessary impetus for change would come from 
within either Russia or Japan. Both states have proven willing to sacrifice greater national 
interests for the sake of four islands that offer little material value. Russia’s interests have 
been hurt much more than Japan’s in this regard because, at the present time, Russia 
needs access to Japanese capital and assistance far more than Japan needs anything from 
Russia. For Russia to develop its Far Eastern krais, oblasts, and okrugs, it will need 
assistance beyond that which foreign oil companies will provide to extract Russian oil. 
However, the possibility remains that, even if the external situation changed in one of the 
ways listed above, the Russians and Japanese may still defy their own national interests 
and maintain the dispute. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY 
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The Kurils dispute will either be resolved, or it will remain stalemated. The 
consequences for regional security of either scenario will be the following:  
1. Resolution 
Resolution of the dispute, while unlikely, could have a significant effect on 
regional security. Japan and Russia have a strained relationship because of their failure to 
resolve this remaining legacy of Stalin’s diplomacy. Consequently, cooperation between 
the two states in North East Asia has remained at a relatively low level compared to 
Japan’s interactions with its other East Asian neighbors, with the possible exception of 
the DPRK. Japanese businesses have largely kept out of the Russian Far East and the 
Japanese have provided little in foreign aid. Russia needs Japanese capital to develop its 
Far East. Currently, the infrastructure in the Russian far eastern provinces is crumbling, 
the population is declining, and laid-up nuclear submarines remain an environmental and 
proliferation danger. Without favorable resolution of the Kuril issue, the Japanese are 
unlikely to provide the capital necessary for development of the Russian Far East. 
Development of the region, to include increased nuclear waste processing facilities, 
infrastructure development and increased security around Russia’s military sites would 
provide increased stability in the region through the elimination of proliferation and 
environmental threats. 
Additionally, Russo-Japanese reconciliation could lead to increased cooperation 
on fisheries, environment, smuggling and organized crime issues that exist in the region. 
These are factors that have an effect on general “human security,” a term Professor Peter 
Uvin of the Fletcher School at Tufts University defines as “a term [that] bring[s] together 
the concerns and practices that deal with the many faces of, and close relations between, 
freedom from fear and freedom from want. Under this rubric fall a broad variety of issues 
and trends, but they all share a desire to cross boundaries between fields of social change 
until now usually treated separately, and a strong ultimate focus on the inclusive well-
being of all human beings.”289 In this area, increased cooperation between Russia and 
Japan could yield benefits through the promotion of closer regional integration between 
Sakhalin, the Russian Far East, Hokkaido, and the Sea of Japan coast of Honshu – all 
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regions that have not benefited substantially from the recent gains in wealth and 
economic development of East Asia. 
Resolution of the territorial issue, however, will not mean alliance. Similarly, 
Russia still has concerns regarding China despite signing a treaty of friendship that 
resolved all disputes along their more than 4,300 km long border, with the exception of a 
small segment measuring approximately 50 kilometers. Russian President Putin has made 
it clear in candid discussion that the relationship with China does not constitute an 
alliance.290 The same would likely be true with Japan, unless the impetus for change was 
the result of full Russian integration into NATO. Even then, the Russo-Japanese security 
relationship would probably only be similar to the Korean-Japanese quasi-alliance in 
which there is a common ally but no common defense structure. 
2. Non-resolution 
It would be simple to say that barring resolution of the territorial dispute, Russo-
Japanese relations and regional security would merely reflect maintenance of the status 
quo. It is true that the dispute will probably continue for the foreseeable future unless 
some unexpected major shift occurs in mutual relations, or in the regional security 
environment. However, allowing the situation to remain in stasis with no final peace 
treaty or full normalization between Russia and Japan will present problems in the future. 
When discussing “security,” it must be acknowledged there are many forms of “security.” 
The likelihood of the Northern Territories dispute provoking an armed clash between 
Russia and Japan is practically non-existent. It is in the realms of environmental and 
human security, however, that the lack of normalization will be noticed. Succinctly 
summing up Japan’s situation, Hasegawa notes that, “Japan’s well-being in integrally 
bound to the fate of the Russian Far East.”291 
While both Russian and Japanese fishermen have had at least limited access to the 
entire Kuril archipelago, including the Northern Territories, the only true beneficiaries of 
the current situation have been criminals and poachers. The northwest region of the 
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Pacific Ocean is the most active fishery in the world, much of the catch going to feed 
Japan, and has sustained numerous collapses in the stocks of various fish.292 Only active 
management and efficient patrolling will be able to counter the effects poachers have 
already had in the disputed waters around the Kurils. While some progress has been made 
in cooperation between the Russian and Japanese Coast Guards, bribes of Russian 
monitors remain a significant problem.293  
Finally, no multi-lateral security regime that includes Japan, Russia, China and 
the United States can ever be implemented as long as the territorial dispute remains and 
there is no final peace treaty. Again, this does not mean alliance, but rather an OSCE-like 
body that could provide a forum for regional actors and increase intergovernmental 
transparency. Asia needs a forum for discussion beyond economic matters, and while the 
Russo-Japanese rift will not seriously affect bilateral relations beyond a simple lack of 
improvement, the inability to create more inclusive security frameworks within Asia will 
remain the primary victim of non-resolution in the Northern Territories dispute.   
C. “LIKE THE ORBITAL PATH OF HALLEY’S COMET”294 
There is still a significant amount of emotional baggage surrounding the territorial 
dispute that must be resolved. At the outset of my research, I believed that the death of 
the World War II generation might lessen the emotional ties that prevent resolution of the 
Northern Territories dispute on both sides. However, a conclusion of my research is that 
the dispute may long outlive the passing of that generation. In fact, the more I have 
researched, the more it seems that a more likely resolution may come about because of 
growing apathy among Japanese or greater economic prosperity in European Russia. The 
imagery surrounding World War II will endure well beyond the death of the Russians 
who lived through the period. Because of increasing Japanese apathy, Moscow’s current 
strategy of delaying any discussion on returning the islands may in the end prove 
successful in retaining Kunashiri and Etorofu for Russia, though it would be a Pyrrhic 
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victory and would come at great cost to Moscow. If Japan’s desires are not satisfied in a 
peace treaty, then it is doubtful the Japanese will ever significantly invest in the Russian 
Far East.  
While the Northern Territories issue is taught in Japanese schools and the country 
celebrates “Northern Territories Day” every year on February 7th, anecdotal evidence 
indicates apathy is growing among the younger generation of Japanese, despite the efforts 
of Japanese semi-governmental organizations such as the Northern Territories Issue 
Countermeasures Association to keep the issue alive.295 There are some statistics in 
Japanese language surveys that indicate the younger generations are more willing to 
compromise than those who have personal memories of the Second World War.296 If the 
purpose of the efforts of groups like the Northern Territories Issue Countermeasures 
Association is to reduce willingness to compromise among the population, those efforts 
do not seem to have not been particularly effective. Indeed, growing apathy is recognized 
by some government-sponsored research.297  
However, the Japanese government may be reluctant to drop the issue even 
though it fails to evoke the same passions in future. Rather, the Northern Territorial 
dispute may become a parochial issue of interest only to those who live in the northern tip 
of Hokkaido, and nowhere else. This does not necessarily mean the issue will be 
resolved, because the Northern Territories can be compared to the situation in the United 
States regarding Cuba policy. U.S. national policy towards Fidel Castro and Cuba is 
driven by a small, but politically influential group located in and around Miami. The LDP 
structure is faction driven, and therefore is capable of being held hostage by an influential 
minority within the party. Indeed, it is factional politics that has held up most Japanese 
reforms, despite overwhelming public desire for change. Therefore, similar to U.S. Cuba 
policy, Japanese policy regarding the Northern Territories may not change, no matter 
what the majority of the Japanese population thinks. 
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As of September 2002 Russian and Japanese officials are preparing for an 
October visit to Moscow by Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi. Negotiations 
for a peace treaty are, as always, on the agenda, but it is likely that no progress will be 
made beyond some vague affirmation of the 1993 Tokyo Declaration or the 1956 Japan-
Soviet Joint Declaration. Recent statements by Russian and Japanese officials make a 
stalemate on the issue a forgone conclusion. President Putin stated during a visit to 
Vladivostok in late August that, “Japan thinks of the Southern Kurils as their territory 
whereas we call it our territory.”298 On the Japanese side, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi 
stressed to former residents of the islands and residents of Nemuro in Hokkaido that 
Japan maintains its policy of seeking the simultaneous return of all four islands.299 The 
statements of both Kawaguchi and Putin have likewise been published in news sources in 
both countries, so at least there should be no unrealistic expectations among the Japanese 
or Russians regarding the talks. Once again, Russia and Japan will talk, and as usual 
nothing will happen.  
In the end, mutual satisfaction on the Northern Territories issue is probably not 
possible. Mutual cooperation may increase further, and one day Russia and Japan may 
finally sign a peace treaty, but barring some unforeseen major event that changes the 
basis of bilateral relations, it is not likely. No matter the benefits each could receive from 
solving the dispute, and no matter the increased regional security a final peace treaty will 
bring, the dispute has become too symbolic an issue and too much national pride has been 
invested on both sides. An anonymous MOFA official described the situation best: “It 
would be difficult to settle the territorial issue unless leaders of both countries maintain a 
stable political base and develop a good relationship with each other. But such a chance 
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